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ARTICLES

EGALITARIANISM AND EXCLUSION:
U.S. GUEST WORKER PROGRAMS AND A
NON-SUBORDINATION APPROACH TO
THE LABOR-BASED ADMISSION OF
NONPROFESSIONAL FOREIGN NATIONALS
ANDREw J. ELMORE*
ABSTRACT

Comprehensive immigration reform has been a top legislative priority for
the last several years, and recent bills have contemplated the expansion of
guest worker programs to adjust the status of undocumented immigrants and
to control the future migrant flow. While there is a broad consensus that the
current immigration system is broken, there is sharp disagreement about
whether it is wise public policy to expand labor-based admissions in order to
provide nonprofessional foreign nationals with an authorized means to
migrate. This Article contributes to this debate by examining current guest
worker programs, and recommends their reform through a "non-subordination" approach that balances the interests of nonprofessional foreign nationals and U.S. workers. Analyzing the current work visa programs, this Article
determines that there exist worker disincentives to complain about or to leave
exploitative workplaces, illusory visa-based rights and exemptions from and
under-enforcement of key workplace protections, and caps and other limitations on guest worker programs that do not approach the migration demand,
* The Author is an Assistant Attorney General in the Civil Rights Bureau of the New York State
Office of Attorney General. The following analysis is offered purely in the author's private capacity
and not as a representative of the New York State Office of Attorney General. I wish to thank Rebecca
Smith, Seth Kupferberg, Mary Bauer, Muzaffar Chishti, Michael Dale, Annette Bernhardt, and Laura
Abel for incisive comments, with special thanks to Noah Zatz and Jennifer Gordon for their
thoughtful suggestions for revision, to Karen F. Lee of the Georgetown Immigration Law Journal for
her comments and assistance, and to the Brennan Center for Justice for housing and supporting the
underlying research. I also gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Skadden Foundation,
and thank its writing stipend committee of Susan Butler Plum and Leti Volpp. © 2007, Andrew J.
Elmore.
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resulting in increased unauthorized migration and the expansion of the
underground economy. These conditions create formal and informal systems
of inequality that subordinate guest workers in the workplace, and fail to
provide a meaningful avenue to engage in authorized migration. Small and
restricted guest worker programs also harm nonprofessional U.S. workers,
who cannot compete with a captive guest workforce or undocumented
workers in the underground economy.
This Article proposes a "non-subordination" approach to labor-based
admissions that would reduce the centrality of individual employers in guest
workers' recruitment and authorized presence in the U.S., equalize the
workplace rights of nonprofessional foreign nationals with U.S. workers,
expand authorized admissions, and permit the circular migration and the
eventual permanent settlement of visa holders. This approach would balance
the nonprofessional foreign national interests in authorized migration and in
equality in the workplace, and the nonprofessional U.S. worker interests in
controlling the migrant flow and in preserving workplace standards. Finally,
this approach would not be objectionable to employers, who could employ
foreign nationals with reduced government restriction and delay. This Article
concludes that while this approach would better control the migrant flow and
preserve workplace standards, it would not fully address unauthorized
migration, which would require a shift in foreign policy to address global
inequality.
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INTRODUCTION

Foreign nationals have fulfilled the United States' shifting demand for
temporary labor for over sixty years. There are over a million visas issued to
foreign nationals authorized to perform temporary or seasonal work in
United States workplaces, 1 making the United States' temporary work-based

1. According to the Department of Homeland Security, in fiscal year 2006 the U.S. granted nearly
400,000 J-1 visas for nonprofessional work in cultural exchange programs, over 350,000 C-1 transit
visas for ship and air crew, over 430,000 H-lB visas for professional workers, about 320,000 L-1
visas for inter-company transfers of professional workers, 134,000 H-2B and H-2R visas for
temporary non-agricultural workers, 46,000 H-2A visas, and several thousand A-3 and G-5 visas for
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admission system not only the longest-running, but also the largest such
program in the world.2 Many of these visas call for temporary work in
nonprofessional occupations inside U.S. borders, which I will call "guest
worker programs," and the holders of these visas "guest workers." 3 While
modest in size compared with the U.S. workforce, 4 guest workers labor in an
increasing scope of occupations, including in agriculture, forestry, domestic
work, hotels and resorts, landscaping, seafood processing, and on cruise
liners.5
Guest worker programs have recently received attention as a potential
solution to control unauthorized migration.6 There are approximately eleven
million unauthorized immigrants in the United States, over five million of
whom are undocumented workers in nonprofessional occupations, 7 and
around 750,000 unauthorized migrants enter the U.S. per year, many of
whom are low-skilled workers.8 Congress, with support from the White

domestic workers for domestic servants of diplomats, consular officers, and other staff of international organizations. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS:
2006 TEMPORARY ADMISSIONS (NONIMMIGRANTS) 2007 available at http://www.dhs.gov/ximgtnl

statistics/publications/YrBk06NI.shtm (last visited September 17, 2007) [hereinafter DHS NONIMMIGRANT STATISTICS]. For the J-1 visa, in 2004 there were about 89,500 summer work travel and trainee
exchange visitors, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, STRONGER ACTION NEEDED TO IMPROVE OVERSIGHT
AND ASSESS RISKS OF THE SUMMER WORK TRAVEL AND TRAINEE CATEGORIES OF THE EXCHANGE VISITOR
PROGRAM 3 (2005) [hereinafter GAO, J-1 REPORT], and over 15,000 an pairs. See Sue Shellenbarger,

Number ofAu Pairs in U.S. Jumps 37% After Rules Change, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Feb. 13, 2005, at 8.
2.

GLOBAL COMM'N ON INT'L MIGRATION, MIGRATION IN AN INTERCONNECTED WORLD: NEW

DIRECTIONS FOR ACTION 83 (2005), available at http://www.gcim.org/en/finalreport.html [hereinafter
GCIM REPORT].
3. Typically, the term "guest worker" applies only to holders of H-2A or H-2B visas. See Andorra
Bruno, Immigration: Policy ConsiderationsRelated to Guest Worker Programs, CONG. RESEARCH
SERVICE 1 (2006). For the purposes of this Article, I employ the term "guest worker" to mean all
foreign nationals granted a nonimmigrant visa to perform nonprofessional labor in workplaces inside
U.S. borders. This definition excludes both professional workers and C/D visa holders who work on
ship or air crew.
4. There are nearly 150 million people in the U.S. workforce. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
DEP'T OF LABOR, THE EMPLOYMENT SITUATION: DECEMBER 2006 3, availableat http://www.bls.gov/

news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf.
5.

See, e.g., Julia Malone, Immigration, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, May 24, 2006, at IC

(describing many H-2A and H-2B workers used in agriculture, seafood processing, landscaping, and
forestry industries); David A. Faherthold, Seafood Plants Lack Shuckers: ProcessorsWant Limits on
Immigrant Workers Raised, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2005, at B2 (describing how 90% of Maryland crab
meat is picked by H-2B workers); Douglas Hanks, Tourism Industry Looking Abroadfor Workers,
MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 1, 2007, at Al (noting that Florida hotels increasingly use H-2B and J-1 student
visas); Paige St. John, Foreign Workers Stuck in Worst U.S. Jobs, THE NEWS-PRESS (Fort Myers, FL),
Feb. 16, 2004, at 3A (reporting that large numbers of C and D visa holders are employed on cruise
liners).
6. This article uses the terms "unauthorized immigrant" or "unauthorized migrant" to refer to all
foreign nationals who reside in the U.S. without any official immigration status, and "undocumented
workers" to refer to immigrants who perform unauthorized work.
7.

PEW HISPANIC CENTER: THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT

POPULATION INTHE U.S., Mar. 7, 2006, at i, 10-11 available at http://pewhispanic.orglfiles/reports/
61.pdf (noting that about three fourths of the approximately 7.2 million undocumented workers work
in low-skill occupations).
8. Jeffrey S.Passel, Estimates of the Size and Characteristicsof the Undocumented Population,
PEW HISPANIC CENTER 2 (2005); Jeffrey S. Passel and Roberto Suro, Rise, Peak and Decline: Trends
in U.S. Immigration 1992-2004, PEw HISPANIC CENTER (2007), availableat http://pewhispanic.org/
reports/report.php?ReportlD=53.
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House, 9 has considered legislation that would expand guest worker programs
to control migration and address the presence of undocumented workers.' 0
Arguments in the debate on whether to expand guest worker programs
implicate the welfare of nonprofessional foreign nationals and U.S. workers,
whose interests are seen as divergent. Commentators in favor of expanding
guest worker programs argue that they would provide needed opportunities
for nonprofessional foreign national workers to engage in authorized migration, and provide a needed supply of nonprofessional workers to U.S.
employers under more humane working conditions than undocumented work
offers." Critics of guest worker programs, on the other hand, see their
expansion as formalizing a two-tier labor force in which guest workers labor
under extraordinarily exploitative conditions, 1 2 and as jeopardizing the
livelihoods of nonprofessional U.S. workers who cannot compete with the
13
wages and work conditions that foreign nationals are willing to accept.
Organized labor, the primary voice of U.S. nonprofessional workers in
national legislative initiatives, and which over the past decade has increasingly embraced foreign born workers, has historically opposed guest worker
programs, 4 and is conflicted over whether an acceptable legislative compro-

9.

See THE WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET: FAIR AND SECURE IMMIGRATION REFORM (2004), available

at http://www.whitehouse.gove/newslreleases/2004/01/20040107-1 (proposing a guest worker program as "[a] more compassionate system-to protect all workers in America with labor laws, the right
to change jobs, fair wages, and a healthy work environment.").
10. For example, the Agricultural Job Opportunity, Benefits, and Security Act of 2003 (H.R.
3142/S. 1645, 108th Cong. (2003) ("AgJobs")), and the Secure America and Orderly Immigration Act
of 2006 (S. 1033/H.R. 2330, 109th Cong. (2005) ("McCain-Kennedy")), would have expanded guest
worker programs to adjust the status of currently undocumented workers and to provide an authorized
means for nonprofessional workers to temporarily work in the U.S. See AgJobs § 101(a)(1)
(conferring temporary resident status to any agricultural worker who could establish 575 hours or 100
days of agricultural employment in the U.S.); McCain-Kennedy §§ 218A(a)-(c) (creating H-5A
temporary worker visa for newly arrived unauthorized. migrants). While AgJobs and McCainKennedy did not become law, they have shifted the discourse to situate guest worker programs as a
central element in proposals for comprehensive immigration reform. See, e.g., S. 1348, 110th Cong.
(2007) (proposing H-2C guest worker visas).
11. Howard F Chang, Liberalized Immigration as Free Trade: Economic Welfare and the Optimal
ImmigrationPolicy, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1190-98 (1997) [hereinafter Chang, LiberalizedImmigration];
MIGRATION POLICY INSTIIJTE, IMMIGRATION AND AMERICA'S FUrTUa: A NEW CHAFTER, 31-41, 64-67 (2006)
[hereinafter MPI, IMMIGRATION AND AMERICA'S FUTruRE] (recommending expansion of work-based immigra-

tion through temporary and "provisional" visas, and safeguards for workers, including charging employers fees
for guest worker applications, allowing guest workers to change jobs, and establishing the same workplace
rights for U.S. and guest workers).
12. SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, CLOSE TO SLAVERY: GUESTWORKER PROGRAMS IN THE
UNITED STATES (2007), available in http://www.splcenter.orglpdf/static/SPLCguestworker.pdf; Rebecca Smith & Catherine Ruckelshaus, Solutions, Not Scapegoats: Abating Sweatshop Conditionsfor
All Low-Wage Workers As A Centerpiece of Immigration Reform, 10 N.Y.U.J. LEG. & PUB. POLICY
(forthcoming Oct. 2007); Michael Holley, Disadvantaged by Design: How the Law Inhibits
AgriculturalGuest Workers from Enforcing Their Rights, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 575 (2001).
13. See AFL-CIO ExEcunvE COUNCIL STATEMENT (2006), available at http://www.aflcio.orglaboutus/
thisistheaflcio/ecouncil/ec02272006e.cfm ("'ro embrace...the creation of a permanent two-tier workforce,
with non-U.S. workers relegated to second-class "guestworker" status, would be repugnant to our traditions
and our ideals and disastrous for the living standards of working families.").
14. LEAn HAUS, UNIONS, IMMIGRATION, AND INTERNATIONALIZATION: NEW CHALLENGES AND
CHANGING COALmIoINs IN THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE 101-3 (2002).

526
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5
mise can include a guest work expansion.1
The current political stalemate on comprehensive immigration reform
highlights the tension between U.S. workers and foreign nationals on how to
control the migrant flow of nonprofessional foreign nationals to the U.S. This
Article contributes to this debate by examining the extent to which current
guest worker programs satisfy the interests of nonprofessional foreign
nationals and U.S. workers, and by recommending measures that would
balance their interests in a labor-based admissions program to regulate the
migrant flow. This Article will draw upon the laws and regulations of
temporary work-based visas and decisional law grappling with the application of workplace protections to guest workers, to identify areas in which
current programs violate the core interests of nonprofessional foreign national and U.S. workers. This Article will then recommend a "nonsubordination" approach that balances the interests of foreign-born and U.S.
nonprofessional workers in U.S. work-based admission programs. Any
approach developed from a study of current guest worker programs in the
U.S. is limited in its ability to predict the impact of a large work-based visa
expansion, because these programs are relatively small and operate in few
sectors. Furthermore, this Article will not address critical immigration issues
raised in recent legislative proposals, including temporary visas for foreign
professional workers, family reunification, and humanitarian immigration
programs. Nevertheless, an examination of U.S. guest worker laws and
regulations offers important insights for whether and how the interests of
nonprofessional foreign nationals and U.S. workers might be balanced
through a work-based admission program.
This Article shall proceed as follows: Part I will introduce the primary
interests of nonprofessional U.S. workers and foreign nationals in immigration reform, which this Article will label "liberty," "equality," and "sovereignty," discuss scholarship that has developed frameworks to address the
tension between foreign national and U.S. nonprofessional workers, and map
what I term a "non-subordination" approach to balance these interests. Part II
will provide a summary of the major visa programs for nonprofessional
workers and of the governmental agencies that regulate them. Part III will
evaluate guest worker programs, thematically presented as employer central-

15. The AFL-CIO opposed the proposal for an expanded guest worker program contained in
McCain-Kennedy, and supported AgJobs, while some of the largest member unions of the Change to
Win labor coalition backed McCain-Kennedy. See Steven Greenhouse, Unions Back New Immigration Policy, N.Y. TIMES, March 1, 2006, at A3 (reporting that the AFL-CIO proposed increasing
permanent resident work visas instead of guest worker program visas, stating that "admitting workers
with ... green cards, was fairer than admitting guest workers who are often treated like second-class
workers."); Sergio Bustos, Bill Would Give Legal Status to Undocumented Farm Workers, Gannett
News Service, Feb. 11, 2005; U.S. FED. NEWS, Business Leaders Applaud Sens. McCain-Kennedy
Plan to Fix Our Broken Immigration System, Oct. 18, 2005 (listing Service Employees International
Union, UNITE-HERE, and United Farm Workers as among the supporters of McCain-Kennedy). For
an overview of organized labor's increasing support for immigration expansion, see HAUS, supra note
14, at 73-103.
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ity in the programs, gaps in the workplace rights of guest workers, and
immigration restrictions and exclusionary measures. Part IV will propose a
non-subordination approach to balance the core liberty, sovereignty, and
equality interests of nonprofessional foreign nationals and U.S. workers. Part
V will raise and address a critique of this approach from the view of U.S.
employers. I will conclude with a critique centering foreign nationals outside
the U.S. and undocumented workers that implies that it is impossible to fully
reconcile the tensions between foreign nationals and U.S. workers without
contemplating broader U.S. foreign policy measures to address global
inequality.
I.

THE LIBERTY,

SOVEREIGNTY, AND EQUALITY INTERESTS OF U.S. AND
FOREIGN WORKERS, AND A NON-SUBORDINATION APPROACH

This section discusses the worker-centered concerns raised in proposals to
expand authorized migration generally, and guest worker programs in particular. In this section I introduce the labels "liberty," to describe the interest of
foreign nationals in the freedom of movement, "equality" to identify the
interest of nonprofessional foreign nationals in equality in the U.S. workplace, and "sovereignty" to describe the concern of nonprofessional U.S.
workers that immigration depresses workplace standards, causes job replacement, and erodes the rule of law. Understanding that these terms, decontextualized, could stand for a variety of positions, they are defined here to
disentangle worker-centered arguments for and against labor-based admissions into separate themes, and to show how each theme resolves in a way
that would violate another core interest. Lastly, this section will discuss
scholarly attempts to reconcile these conflicting views, and introduce the
concept of a "non-subordination" approach.
A.

NonprofessionalForeignNationals

1. Liberty
"Liberty" stands for the interests of foreign nationals in the freedom of
movement. 1 6 Foreign nationals outside the U.S. seek the free movement
across territorial borders, to travel, for job opportunities, for learning experiences, to reunite with family, and to escape political persecution, humanitarian crises and poverty. Work authorized foreign nationals seek the freedom to
return home and engage in circular migration, and to permanently settle with
their families in the place of their choosing. Undocumented workers already
in the U.S. seek all of these freedoms, and to do so without risking arrest,

16.

Joseph Carens, Migration and Morality: A Liberal EgalitarianPerspective, in FREE MOVE-

MENT: ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION OF PEOPLE AND MONEY 25 (Brian Barry &

Robert E. Goodin, eds., 1992).
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detention and deportation. A liberty-based critique of U.S. immigration
policy would view an "open borders" system - in which citizenship is not
fixed to territorial boundaries or to a particular nation-state - as the ideal.
This liberty view is dissatisfying because it fails to acknowledge how
boundaries are a necessary condition to establish egalitarian principles within
the bounded community.1 7 It does not address legitimate concerns that an
unrestricted influx of nonprofessional foreign nationals would increase
joblessness and lower workplace
standards for those nonprofessional work18
ers already within the U.S.
In the alternative, a foreign national might argue that guest worker
programs, while less desirable than permanent migration, are a "second-best"
policy to advance the liberty interests of foreign nationals that is preferable to
complete exclusion from the U.S. or unauthorized migration.) 9 Yet, a guest
worker program can restrict foreign nationals in ways that sacrifice key
liberty interests, such as temporarily returning to the sending country to visit
one's family, and leaving an exploitative job. Further, to the extent that guest
worker programs create a vulnerable sub-class of workers who work in
particular industries, these programs raise the concern that guest workers
depress workplace standards in these industries.2 °
2. Equality
An equality view of foreign nationals inside the U.S., both authorized and
unauthorized, asserts that the right to formal equality in the workplace exists
irrespective of immigration status. 2 1 In Advisory Opinion OC-18, issued in
2003 by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the court considered
whether the denial of domestic law rights to undocumented workers violates
international law.22 The court held that "the fundamental principle of equality
and non-discrimination has entered the domain ofjus cogens[, or a norm that
cannot be violated by any state]." 23 Countries "may not subordinate or
condition observance of the principle of equality before the law and nondiscrimination to achieving their public policy goals, whatever these may be,
17. Id. at 25; DANIEL TICHENOR, DIVIDING LINES: THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION CONTROL IN
AMERICA 288-89 (2002); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND
EQUALITY 31 (1983); BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 95 (1980).
18. TICHENOR, supra note 17, at 296; ACKERMAN, supra note 17, at 93-95.

19. See Howard F. Chang, The Immigration Paradox:Poverty, DistributiveJustice, and Liberal
Egalitarianism,52 DEPAuL L. REV. 759, 775 (2003) [hereinafter Chang, The Immigration Paradox].
20. GCIM REPORT, supra note 2, at 33-34; Philip L. Martin, GATS, Migration, and Labor
Standards, INT'L INST. LABOUR STUDIES, DP/165/2006 (2006).

21. Sarah H. Cleveland, Legal Status and Rights of Undocumented Workers, Advisory Opinion
OC-18/03, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 460, 463 (2005).
22. Although Advisory Opinion OC- 18 came at the request of Mexico, which did not explain why
it sought the ruling, the request came a month and a half after the Supreme Court issued Hoffman

Plastic Compounds Inc., v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 535 U.S. 137 (2002), and is generally
considered to be a response to that decision. See Cleveland, supra note 21, at 460.
23. 2003 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT
annualrep/2003eng/chap3k.htm#Advisory.

425, available at http://www.cidh.org/
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' 24
including those of a migratory character. ,
International law thus directs on equality grounds that nations extend to
transnational migrants the same workplace rights enjoyed by nationals, and
an equal ability to petition courts and government agencies to vindicate these
rights. However, Advisory Opinion OC- 18 does not address two questions by
those who would seek to internalize this equality norm in U.S. domestic law.
First is whether alienage discrimination is really akin to other forms of social
subordination. As Linda Bosniak writes, while a legal disability imposed as a
condition of entrance "shares some characteristics with other forms of social
subordination... [it is] an instance of constitutive boundary maintenance, a
necessary condition for preservation of the community within which the
struggle against social subordination takes place. 25 Immigration restrictions
are not always illegitimate, even if they have the effect of subordinating
transnational workers, if they are necessary to combat other forms of social
subordination. For example, guest worker programs encounter objections
that they disadvantage "second class" citizens, such as racial minorities, for
whom international labor competition threatens the ability to achieve equality in the workplace. 26 Thus, some immigration restrictions may not only be
consistent with egalitarianism, but may be in fact required to preserve it.
Secondly, the equality principle only applies to migrants inside the
territorial borders of the nation-state. From a global perspective, it seems
arbitrary that some foreign nationals who obey immigration law can suffer
total exclusion, while others who engage in unauthorized migration enjoy
equal rights. One might respond that transnational migrants inside the U.S.
have a greater stake to equality because they are members of the community,
and that formal inequalities inside U.S. workplaces threaten egalitarianism
more than general policies of exclusion.2 7 However, one might imagine a
situation in which the excluded foreign national has a greater stake in joining
the polity than the unauthorized migrant inside the U.S., and yet suffers a
greater harm.28

B. Nonprofessional U.S. Workers
The term "sovereignty" is deployed here to represent the interests of
nonprofessional U.S. workers in self-preservation. 2 9 In the sovereignty view,
U.S. immigration policy should primarily advance the existing U.S. polity,

24.

Id.

25.

LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP

1I

(Princeton 2006).
26. Id. at 113, 118-19.
27.
28.
29.

WALZER supra note 17, at 33.
id. at 48.
See MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN

AMERICA 11 (Princeton 2004) (discussing how sovereignty is "the nation's self-proclaimed, absolute
right to determine its own membership, a right believed to inhere in the nation-state's very existence,

in its 'right of self-preservation"').
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which for nonprofessional U.S. workers would entail deterring unauthorized
migration and limiting authorized migration to maintain a high demand for
U.S. workers. 30 In industries such-as agriculture and forestry, where guest
workers and undocumented workers are hired at minimal wages, nonprofessional U.S. workers credibly claim that guest worker recruitment has suppressed workplace standards.3 ' In this view, nonprofessional U.S. workers
would benefit from the elimination of guest worker programs, or by their
limitation to workplaces with a true labor demand that cannot be satisfied by
U.S. workers. 2
A sovereignty view that would rely on exclusion to preserve workplace
standards in low-skill occupations fails to acknowledge that the U.S. has a
long-term need for nonprofessional foreign nationals to supplement the
domestic workforce and to support an aging population. New immigrants
33
accounted for half of the labor force growth in the U.S. during the 1990's.
Between 2000 and 2020, the native-born population aged 25 to 54 is
expected to remain flat, while the number of older residents is predicted to
nearly double in size.3 4 Though some of the workers needed to close this gap
must be professional, many are nonprofessional.3 5 Moreover, while the
migration of nonprofessional foreign nationals may have lowered wages
modestly in some specific occupations and regional labor markets, 36 nonpro-

30.

See WALZER, supra note 17, at 63.

31. See Rebecca Boone, Migrant Workers Claim Idaho Company Violated Wage and Safety Laws,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 15, 2005 (quoting former owner of forestry firm sued for owed back wages
who acknowledged "a great deal of misuse" by firms of guest workers, and that firms "all call the
same agencies to get the same guidelines that we follow"); Leah Beth Ward, Desperate Harvest,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (N.C.), at IA (Oct. 31, 1999) [hereinafter Ward, Desperate Harvest]; Ned
Glascock, Foreign Labor on Home Soil, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 29, 1999, at IA
(discussing the North Carolina Grower's Association, which grossed five million dollars in 1999 for
recruiting and assembling H-2A workforces for growers); Tom Knudson, ContractorsRip Rivals for
Pineros'Plight:A U.S. Senate Panel Takes Up Wage andSafety Issues Today, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar.
1, 2006, at AI (quoting two forestry firms citing "a few bad actors" as the reason why they are unable
to compete). See generally Vanessa Casanova and Josh McDaniel,

"No Sobra Y No Falta":

Recruitment Networks and Guest Workers in Southeastern U.S. Forest Industries, 34 URBAN
ANTHROPOLOGY AND STUDIES OF CULTURAL SYS. AND WORLD ECON. DEV'T 45 (2005) (discussing

preference by employees in Alabama forestry industry for H-2B workers over U.S. nationals).
32. See Kimi Jackson, Farmworkers,Nonimmigration Policy Involuntary Servitude, and a Look
at The Sheepherding Industry, 77 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1271, 1299-1300 (2000); Lorenzo A. Alvarado,
Comment, A Lesson from My Grandfather, The Bracero, 22 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 55, 73
(2001).
33. ANDREW SUM ET AL., IMMIGRANT WORKERS AND THE GREAT JOB MACHINE: THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF NEW FOREIGN IMMIGRATION TO NATIONAL AND REGIONAL LABOR FORCE GROWTH IN THE

1990's 16 (2002).
34. DAVID ELLWOOD, THE ASPEN INSTITUTE DOMESTIC STRATEGY GROUP, "How WE GOT HERE,"
IN GROW FASTER TOGETHER. OR GROW SLOWLY APART (2002); DAVID DIXON, AMERICA'S EMIGRANTS:
U.S. RETIREMENT MIGRATION TO PANAMA AND MEXICO (2006), cited in MPI, IMMIGRATION AND
AMERICA'S FUTURE, supra note 11, at 3-4.
35. LOWELL, GELATT, AND BATALOVA, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, IMMIGRANTS AND LABOR
FORCE TRENDS: THE FUTURE, PAST, AND PRESENT (2006), cited in MPI, IMMIGRATION AND AMERICA'S
FUTURE, supra note 11, at 6 (noting that eleven of the fifteen occupations that will require an influx of
labor require less than a bachelor's degree).

36. See ANDREW SUM ET AL., supra note 33, at 29; John M. Broder, Immigrants and the
Economics of Hard Work, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2006, (Week in Review), at 3.
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fessional U.S. workers as a whole appear not to have lost job prospects or
wages due to immigration.3 7 Thus, the migration of nonprofessional foreign
nationals is overall a benefit to U.S. workers that requires effective regulation
to protect vulnerable U.S. workers, rather than a problem that can be "fixed"
by exclusion.
The sovereignty view is further problematic in that by assuming the
validity of restrictions on foreign nationals in the U.S., the sovereignty view
does not address whether there are some rights that inhere to physical
presence in order to preserve egalitarian ideals, 38 and does not give respect to
the special relationships that some countries have with the U.S. based on
social, political, and economic ties.3 9 Sovereignty can also be animated by an
illiberal tendency to exclude those seen as different. 4 ° Thus, legitimate
concerns regarding the preservation of the polity can be conflated with
nationalist opposition to immigration based on racial or ethnic preference.4 1
C.

Existing Scholarshipand A Non-SubordinationApproach

Recognizing the tensions between nonprofessional U.S. and foreign national workers in immigration law and policy, immigration scholars Howard
Chang and Jennifer Gordon have developed frameworks to balance the
interests of U.S. and foreign workers in proposing work-based immigration
arrangements. Howard Chang proposes a Pareto principle that would admit
aliens and extend workplace rights to foreign nationals in a manner that
maximizes utility for one class of workers without decreasing the utility of
another.4 2 This principle would reject an allocation of rights that attempted to
advance one group through the subordination of another group. 4 3 In this

37.

See Giovanni Peri, IMMIGRANTS' COMPLEMENTARIETIES AND NATIVE WAGES: EVIDENCE FROM

CALIFORNIA

18-19

(2006),

available at http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/gperi/Papers/

californiawpdec06.pdf (examining wage data for natives and foreign born in California between
1960 and 2004 and concluding that immigration increased wages for natives as a whole by four
percent, including a slight wage increase for native high school drop-outs); Howard F. Chang,
Immigration and The Workplace: Immigration Restrictions as Employment Discrimination, 78
CnI.-KINT. L. REv. 291, 305 (2003) [hereinafter Chang, Immigration Restrictions] ("Studies of the
effects of immigration in U.S. labor markets ... have shown little evidence of effects on native wages
or employment."); Rakesh Kochhar, Growth in the Foreign Born Workforce and Employment of the
Native Born, PEw HISPANIC CENTER, 23-24 (2006), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/
69.pdf (offering Census data that shows no relationship between the growth of nonprofessional
foreign workers and the job prospects of nonprofessional U.S. workers).
38. BOSNIAK, supra note 25, at 124.
39. See id. at 10-11; MASSEY, DURAND, AND MALONE, BEYOND SMOKE AND MIRRORS: MEXICAN
IMMIGRATION IN AN ERA OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 145 (Russel Sage 2003).

40. NOAI, supra note 29, at 57-58; see generally Linda S. Bosniak, Opposing Prop. 187:
Undocumented Immigrantsand the National Imagination,28 CONN. L. REV. 555, 559-67 (1996).
41. Victor C. Romero, Devolution and Discrimination,58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 377, 381-84
(2002).
42. Neoclassical economists describe an allocation of rights as "Pareto optimal" if it can make
one individual better off without making any other individual worse off. See Chang, Immigration

Restrictions, supra note 37, at 304-11.
43. See Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto
Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 173, 185 (2000).
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framework, exclusion is a greater harm to immigrants than inclusion is to
U.S. workers, who would gain as consumers from immigrants' lower price
for services. 4" In this model, the only disadvantages of immigration, the
potential cost of social services for immigrants and the lowering of wages of
U.S. workers, can be offset by excluding immigrants from government
benefits and through government assistance to low-wage U.S. workers. 4 5 I
will term this approach "globalist," because its framework equally applies to
foreign nationals and the native born.
Chang's framework rightly asserts that the U.S. cannot be blind to global
inequality and to the economic value of authorized migration. However, the
use of a Pareto principle is problematic as a normative tool where there is a
vastly unequal allocation of rights at the outset. As any condition of entrance
is preferable to complete exclusion, a Pareto principle can justify restrictions
on foreign nationals that would violate core liberty, equality, and sovereignty
interests. Further, privileging the economic utility of immigration ignores
non-economic interests, such as of foreign nationals in visiting family
periodically in the sending country, and of U.S. workers in the uniform
application of employment laws. Thus, while Chang's globalist framework
has added valuable insight to the discussion of how immigration reform
might advance the interests of U.S. and foreign workers, it has not adequately
addressed the concerns raised in this Article.
Jennifer Gordon would balance the interests of foreign nationals in
immigration and U.S. workers to decent workplace standards through a
"transnational labor citizenship" framework in which foreign nationals could
obtain visas by joining a transnational worker organization in the sending
country, and by promising not to work for less than the minimum wage or to
undermine a union contract. 46 In this manner, immigration status would be
tied "to membership in organizations of transnational workers rather than to a
particular employer, and that would provide services, benefits, and rights that
cross borders just as the workers do."47
A constellation of private, worker-controlled transnational organizations to
regulate the flow of migration and set minimum working conditions, if
successful, would satisfy the foreign national interest in authorized migration
and the U.S. worker interest in a means to prevent migration from depressing
workplace standards. Nonprofessional foreign nationals lack capital, skills
and education, without which a nonprofessional foreign national is limited in
her ability to obtain decent workplace standards, even assuming formal
equality.48 Transnational labor citizenship would address the lack of non-

44. Chang, The Immigration Paradox,supra note 19, at 763-64.
45. Chang, Liberalized Immigration, supra note 11, at 1192, 1241.
46. Jennifer Gordon, TransnationalLaborCitizenship, 80 S.CAL. L. REv. 503, 564-70 (2007).
47. Id. at 509.
48. See Douglas S. Massey, Do Undocumented Migrants Earn Lower Wages Than Legal
Immigrants? New Evidence from Mexico, 21 INr'L MIGRATION REv. 267 (1987) [hereinafter Massey,
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professional worker bargaining power through concerted activities, a key
element in preventing the subordination of nonprofessional foreign nationals
in the workplace. However, for this model to work on a large scale, it would
require multilateral agreements with each participating sending country, and
the creation of a massive network of democratic, worker-run organizations in
the U.S. and in participating sending countries.4 9 Since these conditions are
unlikely in the near future, the transnational labor citizenship model should
be viewed as a long-term strategy to reconcile nonprofessional U.S. workers
and foreign nationals in a worker-centered labor-based admissions policy
rather than an immediate recommendation for reform.5 °
This Article proposes an approach, which I term "non-subordination,"
that identifies how current guest worker programs violate core liberty,
sovereignty, and equality interests, and recommends reforms aimed at
balancing these interests. This approach draws from Chang's and Gordon's work a concern for how the U.S. balances the interests of foreign
nationals and U.S. workers in its immigration laws. At the same time, it
would make recommendations aimed at immediate reform, rather than a
long-term reconfiguring of immigration policy that fully reconciles liberty, sovereignty, and equality interests. This approach acknowledges that
the interests of U.S. and foreign workers cannot be fully reconciled in the
short term, and would tolerate the least subordination of each group
necessary to achieve their core interests.

H.

A SUMMARY

OF

U.S.

GUEST WORKER PROGRAMS AND RELEVANT LAWS

AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

Immigration law provides for a range of full-time, nonprofessional,
nonimmigrant workers in U.S. worksites,5 1 falling under one of four categories: (1) seasonal agricultural workers, eligible for H-2A visas; (2) seasonal
or other temporary non-agricultural workers through H-2B visas; (3) domestic workers, through an H-2B visa, au pairs through a J-1 visa, or servants,
attendants of diplomatic, consular and other international organization personnel, who work pursuant to an A-3 or G-5 visa; and (4) cultural exchange work

New Evidence from Mexico] (finding that "the low wages typical of undocumented migrants stem
primarily from their background characteristics rather than their legal status"); Mary G. Powers and
William Seltzer, OccupationalStatus and Mobility Among Undocumented Immigrants by Gender,
INT'L MIGRATION REv., 21, at 47-48 (concluding that undocumented "women become locked into
household service jobs where no mobility is likely").

49.

Gordon, supra note 46, at 565-70.

50.

See id. at 570 ("I offer the transnational labor citizenship proposal in its full form even as I

recognize its achievement is not currently feasible.").
51. This definition of guest workers excludes C and D visas for air and sea crew because these
employees do not work in the territorial U.S., and the F-i visa for work authorized international
students because they are not eligible to work full time.
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programs for trainees, camp counselors, and summer work for international
students through a J-1 visa.52
Of current nonprofessional guest worker programs, H-2A and H-2B visas
are the most general, defining guest workers as "having a residence in a
foreign country which [s/]he has no intention of abandoning who is coming
temporarily to the United States to perform" services in agriculture or some
other temporary service for which there are no available U.S. workers.53
H-2A and H-2B programs are jointly administered by the Department of
Labor ("DOL"), which "certifies" employer applications through its Employment and Training Administration ("ETA"),54 in conjunction with the State
Workforce Agency ("SWA") in the employer's state, 55 and the United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services ("CIS"), which approves or denies the
application and issues the visa. The DOL Wage and Hour Division ("WHD")
enforces wage and hour standards under federal law, including the wage
provisions for some guest workers.
By contrast, the J- 1 visa5 6 is administered solely by the Department of
State ("DOS") pursuant to regulations governing U.S. foreign relations,57 as
an Exchange Visitor Program 58 that furthers "the foreign policy objectives of
the United States."'59 DOS delegates most administrative responsibilities for
J-1 visas to "sponsors," or entities (government agencies, international
agencies, or private U.S. organizations) that act as intermediaries between
the J-1 visa holder and the employer. 60 Those non-professional workers
eligible for J-1 visas may participate in exchange programs as trainees, au
pairs, camp counselors, and students in a summer work program. 6 '
A-3 and G-5, the narrowest of these visas, are solely for domestic work for
personnel of consular, diplomatic, or other international organizations. CIS
issues A-3 and G-5 nonimmigrant visas pursuant to the INA for domestic
workers of diplomatic or consular officers 62 and of foreign governments and
international organizations 63 defined by the International Organizations Immunities Act," respectively. A-3 and G-5 visas only authorize the nonimmi-

52.

8 U.S.C.

§

1101 et seq.; see U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES: IMMIGRATION

VISA CATEGORIES, available at http://www.uscis.gov/graphics/services/
visas.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2007).
53. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H).
54. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(1)(ii)(B)(1) (H-IB); id. § 214.2(h)(1)(ii)(D) (H-2B); see also DOL
Employment Law Guide: Temporary Nonagricultural Workers (H-2B Visas), availableat www.dol.gov/
asp/programs/guide/tnw.htm.
55. 20 C.F.R. § 653.501(d)(2) (H-2A); id. § 655.200 (H-2B).
56. 8 U.S.C. § 1l01(a)(15)(J).
57. 22 C.F.R. Part 62.
58. 22 C.F.R. § 62.2.
59. 22 C.F.R. § 62.1(a).
60. Id. §§ 62.2,62.3(a).
61. Id. §§ 62.31(a), 62.32, 62.5(c), 62.5(h)(3).
62. 8 U.S.C. § ll01(a)(15)(A)(iii).
63. Id. § ll01(a)(15)(G)(v).
64. 79 Cong. Ch. 652, 59 Stat. 669.
CLASSIFICATIONS

AND
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grant to work as domestic workers for the employers listed in the visa
application.6 5
In 1986 Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act
("IRCA"),6 6 which provides for sanctions against employers who knowingly
employ undocumented workers, and prohibits of the use of false documents
to establish work authorization.6 7 The Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") enforces immigration law through border control, employer
sanctions, and workplace raids.
II1.

A WORKER-CENTERED EVALUATION OF

U.S. GUEST WORKER PROGRAMS

From the vantage point of foreign nationals and U.S. workers, guest
worker programs violate core liberty, sovereignty, and equality interests.
Guest worker programs are driven by the demands of individual employers,
who recruit, certify, and have the sole power to hire and fire guest workers,
while guest workers are generally unable to leave their employment. Employer centrality in guest work visas violate the liberty and equality interests
of nonprofessional guest workers in free movement and equality in the
workplace, and the sovereignty interests of nonprofessional U.S. workers in
competing with a vulnerable sub-group of workers, and in deterring unauthorized migration. The workplace rights of guest workers do not satisfy the
equality interest because they are easily violated and are difficult, and
sometimes impossible, to enforce, and contain substantial legislative and
regulatory gaps. Existing guest worker programs fail to meet liberty or
sovereignty goals in free movement or in controlling migration because they
are too small to offer significant opportunities for circular migration, and put
in place restrictions that encourage unauthorized migration. This section will
explore each of these themes, identify where core concerns are in tension,
and produce outcomes at odds with each group's interests.
A. Employer Centrality in Recruitment, CertificationandAuthorized
Presence in the U.S.
Currently, the employer is central to all guest worker programs. The
employer initiates contact with the government, sponsor, and/or recruiter to
solicit visas and workers, dictates the terms and conditions of the contract,
terminates the guest worker at will, and determines whether to extend the
work relationship. At the same time, guest workers typically undergo

65. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(b)(2) (A-3), id. § 274a.12(b)(8) (G-5); see also Volume 9 of the State
Department Foreign Affairs Manual ("9 FAM") 42.21N6.2(a)(3) (requiring A-3 and G-5 visa
applicants to certify to the consular officer considering their application that they will not accept
other employment in the U.S.).
66. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1324a.
67. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a. For a history of the legislative debates that resulted in the enactment of
IRCA, see TICHENOR, supra note 17, at 258-67.
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substantial indebtedness to work in the U.S. and cannot change their
employment upon arrival in the U.S. The centrality of the employer in guest
worker programs harms liberty, equality and sovereignty interests by imposing legal disabilities on guest workers that disadvantage them in the workplace, by heightening the coercive power an employer has over a nonprofessional worker not to complain about or leave an exploitative work relationship,
and by creating incentives for employers to hire guest workers instead of
U.S. workers.
1. Employer-CenteredRecruitment
The first contact a foreign national has with a U.S. guest worker program is
usually a recruiter in the sending country, who is paid by a U.S. employer to
identify foreign nationals who the employer can sponsor for a guest work
visa. There are few visa-based protections for guest workers prior to their
arrival in the U.S. to protect them from recruitment fraud, and to regulate the
recruitment and transportation fees paid by guest workers. For H-2A, H-2B,
A-3, and G-5 visas - all visas discussed except for the J-1 program - there is
no U.S. regulation of foreign recruiters. To the extent that the J-1 visa
requires sponsors to register with DOS and to assume responsibility for the
employers they contract with, the "U.S. Government Accountability Office"
("GAO") has criticized DOS for failing to provide staff to monitor compliance or to communicate its requirements to sponsors. 68 Moreover, the J- 1
visa does not regulate the recruitment fees paid by visa holders. 69 Regarding
transportation fees, only the H-2A visa has regulations requiring employers
to reimburse guest workers for travel CoStS. 70 While the DOS Foreign Affairs
Manual ("FAM") requires A-3 and G-5 employers to pay for travel expenses,71 the FAM lacks the force of law; the H-2B and J-1 visas do not
expressly require the reimbursement of travel costs.
Guest workers often arrive at the U.S. worksite in substantial debt due to
recruitment and visa fees and costs associated with transportation from the
sending country. Recruiters and labor contractors have been criticized for
luring workers "with false promises of high wages and steady work,, 72 and
for charging exorbitant fees that leave guest workers in debt before arriving
at the U.S. worksite.73 Upon arrival, guest workers must borrow additional

68. GAO, J-1 REPORT, supra note 1,at 7.
69. See, e.g., Hanks, supra note 5 (reporting that a J- I hotel worker allegedly paid $4,500 to a
Korean employment firm for a one-year internship in the hotel).
70. The H-2A visa requires that employers reimburse farmworkers for transportation costs after
one half of the job term is complete, 20 C.F.R. § 655.102(b)(5)(i), and for the worker's return to her
home country after the work is complete. 20 C.F.R. § 655.102(b)(5)(ii).
71. 9 FAM41.21 N6.2(d).
72. See, e.g., Joe Gyan, Immigrants Sue Hotel Owner, THE ADVOCATE, Aug. 17, 2006, at B5
(reporting a lawsuit alleging that H-2B workers were lured by a hotel recruiters' false promises).
73. See, e.g., Holley, supra note 12, at 296; Kevin Diaz, Advocates Urge U.S. To Expand
Guest-Worker Opportunities,CHATTANOOGA TMES FREE PREss, Aug. 13, 2006, at AlI (quoting H-2B
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funds to pay for living costs while waiting for their first paycheck, often at
high interest rates.7 4 This debt load pressures guest workers not to complain
about substandard workplace conditions for fear of being terminated or
banned from future guest work, and to increase productivity without regard
for personal safety. Fatigue has been cited as a contributor to work-related
accidents among guest workers in agriculture and agriculture-type occupations, where workers work long hours and are often responsible for the
hours-long commute from the housing camp to remote worksites.75
There are also reports of extreme abuse during the recruitment and
transportation phase of guest work, including recruiters charging exorbitant
up-front fees that result in "virtual debt peonage, ' '76 requiring guest workers
to "pledge collateral in the form of a deed to their land as a condition of being
hired, 77 and recruiters and employers confiscating the guest worker's visa
and passport as a means to prevent the worker from leaving the worksite.78

guest worker alleging that a recruiter charged $1,250 to select him for the position); Leslie Eaton,
Immigrants Hired After Storm Sue New Orleans Hotel Executive, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2006, at Al
(quoting an H-2B hotel worker who "said he borrowed $3,000 to get the job and to pay for travel to
and from the Dominican Republic"); Charles D. Thompson, Jr. and Benjamin Grob-Fitzgibbon,
Dream or D4jti Vu? The Debate Surrounding George W. Bush's Proposed Immigration Reform, 14
LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN CENTER HEMISPHERE 32 (2004) (citing $1,500 as a typical H-2A
worker cost for transportation and costs).
74. See Mary Lee Hall, Defending the Rights ofH-2A Farmworkers, 27 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 521, 522 (2002).
75. Editorial, Indentured Servitude: Valuing Work in U.S. Forests, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 15,
2005, at B8. For example, the survivor of a van accident that killed fourteen forestry workers in
Maine in 2002 recalled that the driver was speeding make up for lost wages due to inclement weather
the day before. Knudson, I Fought to Get Them Out of There, but I Couldn't, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov.
15, 2005, at AI0 [hereinafter Knudson, I Fought to Get Them Out of There].
76. Miriam Jordan and Evan Perez, HotelierExploited Foreign Workers After Katrina,Suit Says,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 2006, at BI (alleging that individual H-2B worker's expenses in reaching U.S.
worksite reached as high as $5,000). Workers who originate from sending countries that require
significant air travel are especially reliant on income earned during the work term to recoup the costs
of arriving in and departing the U.S. For example, H-2A workers from Thailand reported that they
paid up to $8,000 to work in the U.S. for temporary positions. Lornet Turnbull, New State Import:
Thai Farmworkers, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 20, 2005, at Al.
77. Recinos-Recinos v. Express Forestry, Inc., No. 05-1355 Section "1"(3), 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2510, at *5 (E.D. La Jan. 24, 2006) (H-2B forestry worker class action suit alleged that
recruiters required pledging of collateral to prevent workers from leaving the U.S. before contract
completed.); see also Tom Knudson, It Was Like Slavery, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 13, 2005, at All
[hereinafter Knudson, It Was Like Slavery] (reporting complaint by forestry worker that he "signed
over his home" to secure a position).
78. See Nina Bernstein, Suit to Charge That Nursery MistreatedLaborers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8,
2007, at B2 (reporting that twelve H-2B workers alleged that their employer confiscated their
passports to prevent them from leaving the worksite) [hereinafter Bernstein, Suit to Charge]; Dana
Harman, Many 'Guest Workers' Vulnerable, Migrant Advocates Say; Abuse by Employers, Lax
Oversight Cited, USA TODAY, Apr. 26, 2006, at 10A (interviewing a H-2A worker who reported that
the employer confiscated his visa and passport); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HIDDEN IN THE HOME: ABUSE
OF DOMESTIC WORKERS WITH SPECIAL VISAS IN THE UNITED STATES, VOL. 13:2 13 (2001) [hereinafter
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HIDDEN IN THE HOME] (revewing forty-three cases of employment relationships involving migrant domestic workers showed that nineteen or nearly half reported that their
employers confiscated their passports, and in three others the employers initially took their passports
and then agreed to return them).
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These guest workers labor in circumstances that may approach or meet the
legal definition of involuntary servitude.79
Lacking visa-based protections from pre-arrival costs, H-2B, A-3, G-5,
and J-1 visa holders seeking reimbursement for fees and travel costs depend on the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") 8 ° prohibition on deductions of wages for costs that primarily benefit the employer.8 ' Under FLSA,
fees and transportation costs known by the employer as a necessity of the
work arrangement must be paid by the employer by the first pay period,
which has been held by the Eleventh Circuit in Arriaga v. FloridaPacific
Farms82 to include costs and fees known by employers that the guest worker
bears in arriving in the U.S. 3 However, DOL declines to enforce this
ruling.8 4 The lack of legislative or administrative attention to recruitment
practices and transportation costs permits many employers of guest workers
to maintain a workplace practice of requiring workers to incur substantial
debt to pay for recruitment and visa fees and travel costs, 85 while many
recruiters in sending countries fail to disclose those costs as a condition of
guest work.86
2. Lax Standardsfor Guest Worker CertificationandApproval of
Employers
Guest worker programs have formally safeguarded U.S. workers from job
replacement and depressed work standards through visa-based requirements
that guest workers not perform work that could be performed by U.S.

79. See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988). The Kozminski Court held that peonage,
defined as coercion "by threat of legal sanction to work off a debt to a master," is an example of
involuntary servitude violative of the Thirteenth Amendment, observed that threatening an immigrant
worker with deportation might amount to a "threat of legal coercion," and the special vulnerabilities
of a person may be relevant in considering whether a type of legal coercion is sufficient to hold a
person in involuntary servitude. Id. at 942-43, 948. Thus, a guest worker unable to leave an
employment relationship under threat of deportation and who incurs large debts as a condition of the
job approaches the Kozminski standard of involuntary servitude. See United States v. Veerapol, 312
F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that a jury could find that a restaurant owner who threatened
a worker that she recruited illegally from Thailand with, inter alia, deportation if she attempted to
leave, violated the criminal prohibition against involuntary servitude); see also Free the Slaves and
Human Rights Center of the University of California, Berkeley, Hidden Slaves: ForcedLabor in the
United States, 23 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 47, 54 (2005) (discussing slavery case in which grower used
transportation costs to create conditions of debt peonage).
80. 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.
81. 29 C.F.R. § 531.35; see Brennan v. Veterans CleaningService, Inc., 482 F.2d 1362, 1369 (5th
Cir. 1973).
82. Arriagav. FloridaPacific Farms, LLP, 305 F.3d 1228 (1lth Cir. 2002).
83. Id. at 1241-45.
84. See, e.g., Luna-Guerrerov. North CarolinaGrower's Association, 370 F. Supp. 2d 386, 390
(E.D.N.C. 2005) (discussing DOL's current non-enforcement of the Arriagaruling).
85. See Julia Malone, As Big New Guestworker Plan Debated, Smaller Program Prompts
Controversy, Cox NEws SERVICE, May 23, 2006 (reporting that counsel to a forestry firm advised
client that it was not responsible for reimbursing H-2B workers for transportation costs).
86. Boone, supra note 31 (quoting the Director of Idaho Migrant Council who reported that guest
workers are not told about charges and then become indebted at the time that they are expecting their
first paychecks).
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workers, and by prohibiting employers with past violations from participating in guest worker programs. The H-2A and H-2B programs use a certification process to determine whether U.S. workers are available for the
positions, and whether the guest worker's employment would adversely
affect the wages and conditions of U.S. workers. 87 H-2A and H-2B certification requires the employer to demonstrate the need for foreign nationals
through an analysis showing a lack of an available labor pool and proof of a
suitable search for U.S. workers. 88 The J-1 program prohibits sponsors from
placing trainees in positions "which are filled or would be filled by full-time
or part-time employees, 89 while the A-3 and G-5 programs have no
requirement prohibiting the replacement of current employees with visa
holders. Only the H-2A visa program bars employers with recent past
violations from certifying guest workers, although the J-1 program permits
DOS to sanction sponsors of employers who violate the J-1 regulations. 90
Employer certification is an inadequate means to protect U.S. workers
from job replacement or wage reduction by guest workers. The burden for
showing employer compliance with certification requirements rests entirely
on DOL, which would require considerable resources to adequately scrutinize applications before determining whether to approve them. DOL's ETA
has been criticized for failing to adequately review certification requirements. DOL's Office of Inspector General ("OIG") reported that one DOL
regional office approved applications within a day or two of receipt, despite
notification from the corresponding SWA of fraud by the applicants. 91
Moreover, DOL certification enforcement is unlikely to improve given the
limited resources of SWA's and DOL's Office of Foreign Labor Certification
("OFLC"). In 1996, budget cuts reduced SWA staffing for foreign labor certification by nearly half,' and in 2005 DOL eliminated seven of OFLC's nine offices. 93
Despite the shortcomings of DOL's scrutiny of employer certification
applications, the H-2 certification process is preferable to the other programs,
which are virtually unregulated. DOL does not monitor the J-1, A-3, or G-5

87.

1182(m)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii) (H-2A); 20 C.F.R. § 655.3; 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(6)(iv)(A);
["GAL"] No. 1-95 (1994) (H-2B).
20 C.F.R. §§ 653.501(e), 655B (H-2A); GAL No. 1-95(II)(B), (IV)(E)-(F) (H-2B); see also
8 U.S.C.

§

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, GENERAL ADMINISTRATION LETTER

88.

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ADMINISTRATION, FIELD MEMORANDUM No.

25-98 (2005).
89. 22 C.F.R. § 62.22(d)(2)(ii).
90. Under H-2A regulations, ETA must deny an H-2A certification if the employer has violated "a
material term or condition of labor certification" in the previous two years. 20 C.F.R. § 655.90(b)(2)(A).
J-1 sponsors that violate DOS regulations are subject to various penalties, including a written

warning, sanction, and license suspension or revocation, 22 C.F.R. §§ 62.50(a), (c), (e). There are no
sanctions for employers who violate the law.
91. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF LABOR, SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, Vol. 53,
at 21-22 (Oct. 1, 2004 - Mar. 31, 2005).
92. Testimony of John R. Hancock to the House Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, Sept.
24, 1997 ("In the last year, budget cuts imposed on the State agencies have resulted in a reduction of
staff designed for labor certification activities by 40 to 50 percent.").
93. 70 Fed. Reg. 41430 (July 19, 2005).
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programs. The A-3 and G-5 programs have no certification requirement, and
the GAO characterizes DOS's enforcement of the J-1 requirements as
"minimal., 94 Different standards for permitting an employer to obtain a guest
worker creates an incentive for employers to misclassify foreign nationals,
from H-2A to H-2B in order to avoid the more stringent H-2A certification
requirements, and from H-2B to J- 1 to avoid DOL scrutiny entirely. At the
same time, while safeguards for U.S. workers have focused on certification
requirements, which are difficult to enforce because they require DOL to find
inaccuracies in employer applications, there has been insufficient attention
paid to the financial incentive to hire guest workers created by the exemption
of H-2A and J- 1 workers from federal taxes.95
In addition to the lack of safeguards protecting U.S. workers from
replacement by guest workers, the sanctions provisions for employer violations of H-2A program requirements are not adequately enforced to meaningfully protect H-2A workers, and the other programs lack a sanctions provision for employer violations. Despite DOL's authority to sanction H-2A
employers who violate the law, as one court found, "[t]he fact is, when
worker's rights are violated, no one gets sanctioned., 9 6 Both the GAO and
the OIG have reported that DOL had not sanctioned any employers for
violating the law in the decade following the passage of IRCA. 97 The lack of
sanctions for employers who violate visa-based regulations and employment
laws has led to repeated and uncorrected abuse by unscrupulous employers in
these programs. In one instance, farmworker advocates and the North
Carolina Department of Labor in 2001 wrote several letters to the ETA
certifying officer that questioned ETA's certification of a forestry company
for H-2B workers in light of past violations, which were never answered. 98
The following year, the same company hired fourteen H-2B workers who all
died when the company van, which was unregistered, and in which the driver
lacked the appropriate license, sped off a bridge while covering a 90 mile

94. GAO, J-1 REPORT, supra note 1, at 4.
95. H-2A and J-1 employment are exempt from FICA and FUTA. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 3121(b)(1),
(b)(19) (exempting H-2A and J-1 work from FICA); 26 U.S.C. §§ 3306(c)(1)(B), (c)(19) (exempting
H-2A and J- 1 work from FUTA).
96. Vega v. Nourse Farms, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 334, 342 (D. Mass. 1999) (citing an Inspector
General report documenting that it could not identify one instance in which ETA had sanctioned an
employer).
97. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, H-2A AGRICULTURAL GUESTWORKER PROGRAM: CHANGES
COULD IMPROVE SERVICES TO EMPLOYERS AND BETTER PROTECT WORKERS 62-63 (1997) [hereinafter
GAO, 1997 H-2A REPORT]; OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CONSOLIDATION OF
LABOR'S ENFORCEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE H-2A PROGRAM COULD BETTER PROTECT U.S.
AGRICULTURAL WORKERS 17 (1998).

98.

See Knudson and Hector Amezcua, Forest Workers Caught in Web of Exploitation, SACRA-

MENTO BEE, Nov. 21, 2005, at Al; interview with Lori Elmer, Staff Attorney, Legal Aid of North
Carolina, Oct. 13, 2006 (interview and cited correspondence on file with author).
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commute. 99 Even after this accident, the employer was able to obtain a labor

certification for H-2B workers.'°

3. Employer Centrality in the Authorized Presence of Guest Workers
A nonprofessional guest worker's present and future authorized presence
in the U.S. is generally dependent on his or her recruitment and retention by
U.S. employers. Only the J-1 visa permits guest workers to change.employment during a visa term ("portability"),10 1 which is at the discretion of DOS,
and all programs subject guest workers to deportation upon the loss of work.
No guest work visa allows for the permanent adjustment of status. To remain
in the U.S. as a guest worker, foreign nationals must engage in circular
migration by reapplying for visas from the sending country, each time after
having been recruited by a U.S. employer.
Conditioning a guest worker's authorized presence in the U.S. on her
relationship to a single employer sacrifices the liberty interest in the freedom
to change employment, the equality interest disfavoring the placement of
legal disabilities on foreign nationals in the workplace, and the sovereignty
interest in promoting the rule of law and deterring unauthorized migration.
Guest workers' liberty interest in the fundamental right to leave a workplace
at will is substantially restricted by the extraordinary consequence of deportability upon exercising this right. 10 2 Lack of portability also establishes a
system of formal inequality in the workplace, since it coerces guest workers
not to complain about workplace violations or to engage in self-help to leave
an abusive employer. 10 3 In addition to the lack of freedom to leave a
workplace and the inequality that results from this legal disability, lack of
portability adversely impacts the safety and welfare of guest workers.
Injuries and fatalities of guest workers have resulted where guest workers'
heightened fear of termination for complaints have caused dangerous work

99. Tom Knudson, I Fought to Get Them Out of There, supra note 75.
100. Josie Huang, Season of Change in North Woods, PORTLAND PREss HERALD (MAINE), July 6,
2003, at IA.
101. 22 C.F.R. § 62.41(a), (b), (d). AJ-1 visa holder denied permission to change categories must
depart the country with thirty days of the denial or the expiration of the application, whichever is
later. Id. § 62.41(e).
102. See, e.g., Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 69 N.Y.2d 329, 333 (N.Y. 1987) (permitting
employees to leave their employment at will is a fundamental protection in the common law at-will
doctrine); Sam Quinones, Many of Katrina's Migrant Workers Go Unpaid, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 11,
2006, at AI5 (reporting that a hotel H-2B worker complained that the hotel management had stated to
him, "[Y]ou belong to the person who contracted you").
103. See Ward, Desperate Harvest, supra note 31 (reporting that because a group of H-2A
workers walked off a job, allegedly to escape substandard workplace conditions, they immediately
became subject to deportation and forfeited their transportation home and other H-2A pay guarantees).
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environments because workers will only report health hazards when they are
too injured or ill to work.' °4
Lack of portability also sacrifices sovereignty by undermining the ability
of U.S. workers to compete with guest workers, eroding the rule of law, and
encouraging undocumented work. For an employer, a guest worker might be
preferable to a U.S. worker because of the former's loyalty: a guest worker
who refuses to accept a term of employment risks termination before having
paid her recruitment and arrival costs, immediate deportation and, often, an
inability to find future authorized work in the U.S. U.S. workers, who by
definition may leave employment at will, are at a competitive disadvantage
against a "captive workforce" 10 5 that has such overwhelming incentives not
to quit. Lack of portability also erodes the rule of law in nonprofessional
workplaces by creating powerful incentives for guest workers not to complain about workplace conditions. The General Accounting Office ("GAO")
concluded in a report that H-2A workers' fear of losing their jobs or of not
being hired in the future make them unlikely to complain about worker
protection violations. 10 6 For example, DOL received no complaints from
H-2A workers in 1996, despite the GAO's analysis that suggests that H-2A
workers during that period were not paid guaranteed wages.t 0 7 Lack of
portability also results in unauthorized work. Workers who flee exploitative
work conditions or who leave the job site because no work is available must
engage in unauthorized employment in the U.S. in order to earn sufficient
income to return home. 108
By conditioning entry and re-entry in the U.S. on recruitment by and
approval of a U.S. employer, guest worker programs sacrifice the liberty
interest in freedom of movement and the sovereignty goal of deterring
unauthorized migration. While foreign fiationals who obtain guest worker
visas may initially intend to reside in the U.S. only for the term provided in
the visa, as circular migration continues over time, migrant workers increas-

104. Id. (A nurse practitioner at a health center in North Carolina reported treating twenty-seven
H-2A tobacco workers who "had symptoms [of nicotine poisoning] early in the week but told her they
were afraid to complain until it was too late.").
105. KITTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE: THE BRACERO PROGRAM, IMMIGRATION, AND THE I.N.S.
42, 74 (Routledge 1992) (linking lack of portability in Bracero program to exploitation of migrant
workers during this period); see also TANYA BASOK, TORTILLAS AND TOMATOES: TRANSMIGRANT

MEXICAN HARVESTERS INCANADA 106-28 (McGill-Queen's University Press 2002) (criticizing lack
of portability in Canadian guest worker program, which results in "captive labor" that employers
value for its loyalty and reliability despite having to pay for the cost of transportation).
106. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, H-2A AGRICULTURAL GUESTWORKERS: STATUS OF CHANGES
TO IMPROVE PROGRAM SERVICES. 10 (2000) [hereinafter GAO, STATUS OF CHANGES]; see also

Cleveland, Lyon, and Smith, Inter-American Court of Human Rights Amicus Curiae Brief The United
States Violates InternationalLaw When Labor Law Remedies Are Restricted Based on Workers'
Migrant Status, 1 SEAT'LE J. SOC. JUST. 795, 811 (2003) (reporting that a DOL administrator linked
worries of deportation to lack of complaints).

107. GAO, 1997 H-2A REPORT, supra note 97, at 9.
108. See Hannan,supra note 78 (describing how a guest worker alleged that the hidden costs of coming
to the U.S. and underpayment by the employer left him in debt, and that he left the job and worked "illegally,
installing sprinklers for a few weeks to recoup some of his money before returning home").
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ingly affiliate with the U.S. and wish to permanently settle. 109 However, only

the H-2B program, which caps new H-2B visas but does not limit the rehiring
of previous H-2B workers, 1 0 accommodates this liberty interest by provid-

ing an incentive for employers to rehire guest workers for the following work
term. Those guest workers who are not rehired, and who wish to continue to
engage in circular migration, are likely to remain in the U.S. after the visa
expires as an undocumented worker. While the U.S. does not keep statistics

about the proportion of guest workers who return at the end of a visa term,
data from one major employer suggests that many H-2A workers remain in
the U.S. as undocumented workers after their visas expire.111 Thus, guest
worker programs in conditioning re-entry on employer recruitment undermine liberty interests and the sovereignty interest in deterring unauthorized

migration.
Lastly, by conditioning authorized presence in the U.S. solely on a

prospective offer of employment, guest worker programs miss a key opportunity to target in its labor-based admissions countries from which unauthorized migration is the greatest, or where admissions might serve humanitarian or family reunification goals.
B.

Illusory Workplace Rights: Legislative Gaps, Administrative
Nonenforcement, and the Difficulties of Enforcement

Despite the fact that there are visa-based protections, employment laws
with private rights of action, and governmental agencies charged with
protecting the workplace rights of guest workers, nonprofessional guest
workers labor under difficult and often dangerous circumstances,' 12 and are

109. See Mary M. Kritz, InternationalMigration Policies: Conceptual Problems, 21 INT'L
MIGRATION REV. 951, 951-52 (1987). A survey of unauthorized immigrants found that twenty-seven
percent who arrived less than five years earlier believed they would stay in the U.S. less than two
years, but only thirteen percent who arrived six to ten years earlier offered the same response. PEw
HISPANIC CENTER, FACT SHEET: RECENTLY ARRIVED MIGRANTS AND THE CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE ON

2-3 (2006), availableat http://pewhispanic.org/files/factsheets/l5.pdf.
110. Congress has raised the H-2B cap to encourage circular migration through annual one-year
extensions to the H-2R visa, which is reserved for returning H-2B workers. See, e.g., H.R. 5122,
109th Cong. (2006) (extending for one year the cap on H-2B visas for returning workers otherwise
subject to H-2B numerical limitations).
11. GAO, 1997 H-2A REPORT, supra note 97, at 61 ("Data from a major employer showed that
almost 40 percent of their H-2A workers (1,763 workers) left prior to the end of the contract, losing
their right to both the three-quarters guarantee and transportation home."). Departure before the end
of an H-2A contract suggests the worker's unauthorized presence because the worker relinquishes the
right to free transportation home, presumably because the worker does not wish to return.
112. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, CENSUS OF FATAL OCCUPATIONAL
INJURIES 13 (2005) (Forestry, agriculture, and construction rank two, six, and ten, respectively, in U.S.
occupations by fatality rate; agriculture and forestry have fatality rates ten times over the national
average.); Tom Knudson and Hector Amezcua, Hidden Hazards, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 14, 2005, at
Al [hereinafter Knudson and Amezcua, Hidden Hazards] (reporting H-2B forestry workers killed in
roadside accidents, crushed by fallen trees, blinded by branches, and cut by chainsaws); Ward,
DesperateHarvest, supra note 31 (H-2A worker suffered permanent brain damage because of heat
stroke in the field.); Leah Beeth Ward, They Don't Want Their Men Coming to N.C. Anymore,
IMMIGRATION
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often underpaid or are paid nothing at all for their work.' 13 Guest worker
programs are often utilized by employers to impermissibly discriminate in
their employee selections,' 14 and employer retaliation against guest workers
have been found in reports and by courts and administrative agencies to
of blacklisting," 5 and violence and false
include widespread practices
6
criminal allegations.11
Uniform workplace rights serve foreign nationals' interest in equality in
the workplace and the sovereignty interest in preventing the creation of a
vulnerable sub-class of workers that drives down wages and workplace
conditions for U.S. workers. Courts analyzing guest workers' workplace
rights have generally presumed the applicability of labor and employment
laws to guest workers, on the grounds that these laws should be uniformly
applied to effect their remedial purposes. For example, an immigration
regulation permitting the revocation of work authorization of employed
nonimmigrant workers when a strike was ratified by a minority of U.S.

CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Oct. 31, 1999, at A13 (reporting that an H-2A worker died from tobacco
poisoning).
113. See, e.g., Nancy Cleeland, ContractorFined Over Treatment of Workers: An L.A. Company
is Told to Pay Back Wages to Thai Laborers Hired on Agricultural Visas, L.A. TIMES, May 23, 2006,
at B 1 (citing DOL investigation that concluded that an H-2A contractor must pay nearly $300,000 in
back wages to eighty-eight Thai workers); Knudson, It Was Like Slavery, supra note 77 (describing
forestry workers' allegations of $1.50 per hour payment); Boone, supra note 31 (H-2B forestry
workers in suit against firm alleged payment of $2.00 per hour.); HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HIDDEN IN
THE HOME, supra note 78, at 6-11 (interviewing domestic workers with A-3, B-I, and G-5 visas who
reported making hourly wages between $1 to $2 per hour).
114. See, e.g., Farm Workers Granted Certificationin Labor Law Class Action: Perez-Fariasv.
Global Horizons, No. 05-3061, (E.D. Wash. July 28, 2006), CLASS ACTION LAW MONITOR, Sept. 15,
2006 (H-2A workers sued farm labor contractor for race and national origin discrimination.);
Olvera-Moralesv. Sterling Onions, 322 F. Supp. 2d 211, 220 (N.D.N.Y. 2004). A suit by the Equal
Employment Opportunities Commission ("EEOC") alleged that a farm in upstate New York subjected
Jamaican guest workers to racial slurs and charged them for housing while other non-black and
non-Jamaican migrant pickers received free housing. See EEOC v. Porpiglia Farms, Complaint,
06-CV-1124 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2006); EEOC v. PorpigliaFarms, Consent Decree, 06-CV-1124
(N.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2006) (both on file with author).
115. Beliz v. W.H. McLeod & Sons Packing Co., 765 F.2d 1317, 1332 (5th Cir. 1985) (noting that
guest workers must "overcome a general background of fear and intimidation caused by the
widespread practice of retaliation against those who complain about violations"); Harman, supra note
78 (quoting Mexican migrant worker agency that guest workers "are scared to death their boss will
report them to the consulate and they will be blacklisted and never get a visa again"); Holley, supra
note 12, at 596-97 (describing a 1999 study of H-2A workers that found that blacklisting of workers
"appears to be widespread, is highly organized, and occurs at all stages of the recruitment and
employment process"); Thompson and Grob-Fitzgibbon, supra note 73 ("If a worker leaves before
the end of the growing season, even because of illness, he is forbidden to return for three years. After
the three years are up, he is placed at the bottom of the list, making it unlikely that he will get a return
spot.").
116. See, e.g., United States v. Alzanki, 54 F.3d 994, 999 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding an employer to
have physically assaulted a nonimmigrant domestic worker in response to a complaint about her
living conditions); Recinos-Recinos v. Express Forestry,Inc., No. 05-1355 Section "1"(3), 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2510, at *23-*24 (E.D. La Jan. 24, 2006) (finding credible allegations that after H-2B
forestry workers sued an employer for owed back wages, the employer sent an agent to Guatemala to
coerce the guest workers via their families to drop the suit); Centeno-Bernuy v. Perry,302 F. Supp. 2d
128, 132, 137 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (Defendant employer complained to state and federal agencies that
H-2A workers were "terrorists" and members of "a sleeper cell" in order to have them removed from
the U.S., after the workers sued him for owed back wages.).
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workers in the firm i t7 was held invalid, because the regulation squarely
conflicted with the NLRA grant of "employee" status to nonimmigrant
workers.1 18 The district court rejected defendants' argument that enforcement
of the regulation protects U.S. workers, in part because "the long term
consequence of enforcement of the regulation would be detrimental to
American labor." 119 In Olvera-Moralesv. Sterling Onions,1 20 a district court
held that a female H-2B worker who alleged that defendant grower and
recruiter steered her and other women into less remunerative H-2B occupa-.
tions instead of H-2A occupations could file suit despite the fact that the
alleged discriminatory conduct occurred before she obtained the H-2B visa.
In holding that anti-discrimination law protections are triggered before the
employee obtains authorization to work in the U.S., the court observed that a
contrary rule "has the potential to invite abuse by employers and to undermine the goals of Title VII. ' 121 Thus, courts have recognized an interest of
foreign nationals and U.S. workers in equal rights irrespective of immigration status in order to effectuate equality in the workplace and to avoid
creating a vulnerable sub-class of foreign national workers.
However, the equality and sovereignty interests in uniform workplace
rights are in tension with guest worker programs, which admit foreign
nationals under two irreconcilable conditions: that they enjoy fewer rights
than U.S. workers, yet their admittance cannot "adversely affect" workplace
standards. While guest worker policies purport to justify workplace inequalities based on the sovereignty goal of protecting U.S. workers, the lack of
enforceable workplace rights for guest workers harms U.S. workers by
depressing the workplace standards where guest workers labor.
1. Visa-Based Rights Are Often Illusory
Nonprofessional guest work visas contain workplace protections independent from general employment laws. While special protections for guest
workers would seem appropriate given the particular vulnerabilities of guest
workers, these protections are often unenforceable, or, contrary to their
stated purpose, operate to prevent guest workers from improving their terms
and conditions of employment. Illusory visa-based rights undermine the
sovereignty interest of avoiding the creation of a vulnerable sub-class of
workers.

117. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(14)(iv).
.118. WJA Realty Limited Partnershipv. Nelson, 708 F. Supp. 1268, 1277-78 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
119. Id. at 1278. Courts have also applied this reasoning to the question of whether employment
laws apply to undocumented workers. See Patel v. Quality Inn South, 846 F.2d 700, 704 (11 th Cir.
1998) (upholding fight of undocumented workers to remedies in Fair Labor Standards Act because "if
the FLSA did not cover undocumented aliens, employers would have an incentive to hire them.
Employers might find it economically advantageous to hire and underpay undocumented workers and
run the risk of sanctions under the IRCA").
120. 322 F. Supp. 2d 211 (N.D.N.Y. 2004).
121. Sterling Onions, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 220.
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The most robust of visa-based protections are in the H-2A program.
Employers applying for H-2A workers' 22 must provide wages and benefits at
or above a wage designated by DOL below which there would be an adverse
effect on the wages in the industry ("Adverse Effect Wage Rate" or "AEWR"),
123
or the applicable federal and state minimum wages, whichever is higher.
in
In addition, employers must guarantee three-fourths of the hours promised 125
1 24
food.
and
housing
provide
and
rule"),
("three-fourths
the contract
However, since the three-fourths rule can only be violated after the contract is
complete, after which the worker must immediately leave the country, 126 it is
virtually impossible for DOL to enforce this rule. 127 Furthermore, the AEWR
has been criticized for operating as a ceiling on wages, because a worker who
demands a rate above the AEWR may be replaced with a new H-2A worker
willing to accept the AEWR.' 28 The fact that H-2A wages declined twenty
percent between 1989 and 1998 suggests129that the AEWR has been an
ineffective tool at maintaining a wage floor.
Unlike the H-2A program, DOL never promulgated regulations regarding
the H-2B visa, instead administrating the H-2B protections by General
Administrative Letter 1-95 ("GAL 1-95"), which does not have the force of
law. 130 Pursuant to GAL 1-95, the employer need only state the nature, wage
and working conditions of the job, and assure that the wage and other terms
meet prevailing conditions in the industry. 131 Unlike the H-2A AEWR, which
DOL enforces as a minimum wage for H-2A workers, DOL declines to assert
jurisdiction over the H-2B prevailing wage as a minimum wage floor,' 32 and
only utilizes the stated wage as a base to calculate overtime pay. 133 However,
like the H-2A AEWR, the H-2B clearance order wage rate is part of an

122. H-2B "logging" employment contains the same regulations as for H-2A employment. See 20
C.F.R. § 655.202.
123. 20 C.F.R. §§ 653.501(d)(2)(vi)-(viii), (x)-(xi), (xv); id. § 655.107 (H-2A); id § 655.202(b).
124. 20 C.F.R. § 655.102(b)(6).
125. 8 U.S.C. § 1288(c)(4); 20 C.F.R. 655.102(b)(1).
126. GAO, 1997 H-2A REPORT, supra note 98, at 9-10.
127. See Jackson, supra note 32, at 1287.
128. Gordon, supra note 46, at 541. The AEWR is similar to the wage formula employed during
the Bracero Era that was widely criticized for suppressing wages. See Ernesto Galarza, MERCHANTS
OF LABOR: THE MEXICAN BRACERO STORY 135-41 (1964).
129. RURAL MIGRATION NEWS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR REPORT TO CONGRESS: THE AGRICULTURAL LABOR MARKET - STATUS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 16 (2000), available at http://

migration.ucdavis.edu/rmn/word-etc/dec 2000_labor.htm#_ftnref36.
130. See, e.g., Sweet Life v. Dole, 876 F.2d 402, 406 (5th Cir. 1989) ("DOL concedes that the
guidelines, which were not promulgated pursuant to a notice and comment procedure, do not have the
force of law.").
131. GAL No. 1-95 (IV)(D) (H-2B); see DOL ETA Form 750.
132. However, for H-2B workers who work in agricultural-type sectors, DOL has jurisdiction
to enforce the Agricultural Migrant and Seasonal Worker Protection Act (AWPA), 29 U.S.C. § 1801,
et seq., which incorporates the clearance order as its minimum wage requirement. See Donaldson v.
DOL, 930 F.2d 339, 349-350 (4th Cir. 1991) (concluding that the Wagner-Peyser requirements are
incorporated in wage guarantee of the AWPA).
133. DOL Field Operations Handbook (dated June 30, 2000) § 32j08(c).
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34
enforceable contract that may be enforced as a contract claim. 1
By contrast, the J-1, A-3 and G-5 wage requirements are likely unenforceable. A-3
and G-5 nonimmigrants are only guaranteed under the FAM a
"fair" 135 wage sufficient to ensure that the applicant will not become a public
charge, 136 while J-1 visa holders must receive "pay and benefits commensurate with those offered to their American counterparts." 137 DOL has no
specific authority to enforce the FAM; while it could enforce the J-1
regulation generally, without any guidance on what "commensurate" means,
it is not clear whether DOL does or can enforce this provision. Furthermore,
if the visa holders are not provided express terms of employment, the general
J-1, A-3 and G-5 wage requirements are only privately enforceable if they
constitute a contract that a guest worker could enforce as a third party
beneficiary. This would require a showing of a valid contract, intended to
benefit the guest worker, of a "sufficiently immediate" nature to show an
obligation to compensate the worker if she is not paid in accordance with
requirement.1 38 As the requirements in the A-3, G-5, and J-1 programs set
forth generalized standards rather than a specific wage rate like the H-2A or
H-2B clearance orders, these terms may not be enforceable. Thus, despite
visa-based rights that would seem to provide special protections to guest
workers, these rights often fail to establish significant legal protections
against substandard wages, which undermines the sovereignty goal of
avoiding the creation of a vulnerable sub-class.

2. Gaps in Uniform Workplace Protections
Lacking meaningful visa-based protections, guest workers rely on employment laws that provide universal protection to workers in U.S. workplaces.
However, the effectiveness of these protections is substantially limited by
statutory exemptions of guest workers and the occupations they work in, and
by courts interpreting international law to limit the applicability of domestic

134. The Eleventh Circuit explains: "On a clearance order, an employer certifies that 'this job
order describes the actual terms and conditions of the employment being offered by me, and contains
all the material terms and conditions of the job.' Therefore, the clearance orders ultimately become
the work contract between the employers and farmworkers." Arriagav. Fla. Pac. Farms,L.L.C., 305
F.3d 1228, 1233 n.5 (11th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
135. See 9 FAM 41.21 N6.2(a).
136. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(B) (requiring consular officer to consider the "assets, resources, and
financial status" of the nonimmigrant as a condition of admission). This includes submission with the
application an employment contract signed by the employer and employee guaranteeing compensation at the "state or federal minimum or prevailing wage, whichever is greater[,]" taking into account
deductions for food and lodging, and a promise by the employer not to withhold the passport of the
employee, and not to require the employee to remain on the premises after working hours without
compensation. 9 FAM 41.21 N6.2(a)(l), (3)-(4), (b).
137. 22C.F.R. § 62.31(f).
138. See Chen v. Street Beat Sportswear, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 2d 355, 365-66 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)
(holding that DOL's agreement with a garment retailer requiring it to ensure that its contractor's
employees are paid the minimum wage permitted the employees to sue for breach of contract as
third-party beneficiaries).
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law to foreign recruitment activities. In light of guest workers' inability to
port and the unenforceability of visa-based protections, their exemption from
uniform workplace rights not only violates the interest of nonprofessional
foreign nationals in equality, but also substantially undermines the sovereignty goal of preserving workplace standards by removing any floor at all.
Further, the exemption of undocumented workers from key workplace
protections violates equality and sovereignty interests by creating an even
more vulnerable sub-class of workers.
The primary wage protections for guest workers apart from visa-based
contractual rights are FLSA and the Agricultural Migrant and Seasonal
Worker Protection Act ("AWPA"). 1 39 The AWPA applies to migrant workers
in agricultural and related occupations, t4° and incorporates the clearance
order wage guarantee. 14' Further, the AWPA requires farm laborer contractors to register themselves and their employees with the Secretary of
Labor, 14 2 to provide a written disclosure detailing the terms and conditions of
employment, 143 and to adhere to housing' 44 and motor vehicle safety
standards.1 45 If an employer violates the AWPA, the DOL may assess a fine,
revoke the employer's certification, and seek injunctive relief and/or remedy
employer retaliation. 146 Covered workers may sue farm labor contractors,
agricultural employers, agricultural associations or any "other person" in
federal court to enforce all AWPA guarantees. 147 However, H-2A workers are
exempt from AWPA; 1 48 the only guest workers who benefit from the
protections of AWPA are those H-2B workers who work
in agricultural-type
149
gathering.
straw
pine
and
forestry
as
occupations, such
While FLSA has no visa-based exemptions, occupational exemptions
substantially limit the protections that the FLSA offers guest workers. Taken
together, the H-2A, H-2B, A-3, G-5, and J- 1 visas primarily employ nonprofessional laborers in (1) agriculture and related fields such as canning and
packing, seafood processing, forestry and pine straw gathering; (2) domestic
work; (3) landscaping; (4) construction; and (5) leisure and hospitality
139. 29 U.S.C. § 1801, et seq.
140. AWPA broadly defines "agricultural employment" to include farms, ranches, canneries,
packing, and processing, and forestry, and includes farm labor contractors. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1802(2)-(3).
See Mark J. Russo, Note: The Tension Between the Need and Exploitation of Migrant Workers: Using
MSAWPA's Legislative Intend to Find a Balanced Remedy, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L. 195, 204-6 (2001).
141. See Donaldson v. DOL, 930 F.2d 339, 349-50 (4th Cir. 1991).
142. 29U.S.C. § 1811.
143. 29 U.S.C. § 1821(a).
144. 29 C.F.R. § 500.130(d). The Occupational Safety and Health Administration establishes
housing safety and health standards. Id.
145. See DEP'T OF LABOR, WAGE AND HOUR ADVISORY MEMORANDUM No. 2006-1, GUIDANCE ON
MSPA VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS (2006).

146. 29 C.F.R. §§ 500.140(a)-(h) (listing DOL enforcement powers), 500.143 (listing factors that
DOL must consider in assessing a monetary penalty).
147. 29 U.S.C. § 1854(a).
148. 29 U.S.C. § 1802(8)(A).
149. See, e.g., Morante-Navarro v. T&Y Pine Straw, Inc., 350 F.3d 1163, 1169 (11th Cir. 2003)
(finding that pine straw gathering is encompassed in AWPA's definition of "agriculture").
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occupations. 150 Of employees in these industries, employees in seasonal
recreational establishments and seasonal camp employees are entirely exempt from the FLSA, 51 t and agricultural workers, live-in domestic workers,
workers who work in resorts on public lands and employees of small forestry
firms and mills are exempt from FLSA's overtime requirement. 15 2 Since the
J-1 camp counselor program provides a short-term visa for "youth workers,"1 53 and J-1 trainees are not "employed" under FLSA unless the work
154
confers a benefit on the trainer and the trainee receives compensation,
most J-1 camp counselors and many J-1 trainees are likely exempt from
FLSA wage guarantees. Furthermore, in agriculture, forestry, and construction, industries in which employers often subcontract work, firms that
contract for guest worker labor may be insulated from FLSA liability
if the
"economic reality" does not reveal an employment relationship.1 55
Statutory exemptions and limitations have also limited the applicability of
laws protecting the rights of guest workers to join a union, and to a healthy
and safe workplace and compensation for work-related deaths. The National
Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") exempts agricultural laborers, forestry workers, domestic workers, and some food processing workers. 156 The Occupa-

150. While H-2B visas are not limited to particular industries or occupations beyond the general
restriction to non-permanent jobs, DOL data on H-2B labor certifications suggest that "the top five
H-2B occupations in FY 2004, in terms of the numbers of workers certified, were: (1) landscape
laborer, (2) forestry worker, (3) maids and housekeeping cleaners, (4) construction worker, and (5)
stable attendant." Bruno, supranote 3, at 5. Substantial numbers of J-1 visa holders work as domestic
workers, camp counselors, and in the restaurant and hotel industries. See GAO, J-1 REPORT, supra
note 1, at 3; Shellenbarger, supra note 1.
151. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(3) (defining a seasonal camp as an entity that operates for less than seven
months per year or earns less than a third of its revenue during half of the year); id. at § 213(a)(15).
152. 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(12); DOL v. N.C. Growers Ass'n, 377 F.3d 345, 348-49 (4th Cir. 2004)
(regarding agricultural work); 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(21); 29 C.F.R. § 552.109(c) (regarding live-in
domestic workers); 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(29); Chessin v. Keystone Resort Mgmt, Inc., 184 F.3d 1188,
1194 (10th Cir. 1999) (exempting a ski resort in national park); 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(28) (applying to
forestry firms and mills with eight or 'fewer employees).
153. 22 C.F.R. § 62.30(b)(2), (h)(2).
154. See Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 293, 301-2 (1985)
(concluding that volunteers for a for-profit business operated by a religious organization who
performed work in return for food and board, clothing, transportation, and medical benefits were
covered by FLSA because they worked for the expectation of compensation and conferred a benefit
upon the employer).
155. See, e.g., Martinez-Mendoza v. Champion Int'l Corp., 340 F.3d 1200, 1210-15 (11th Cir.
2003) (held that H-2B forestry workers were not employees of the paper manufacturer that contracted
with a labor contractor for the H-2B worker's labor under the FLSA "economic realities test" because
the manufacturer did not supervise the employees, lacked the power to hire or fire the workers, and
only worked for the manufacturer for several weeks. Further, the work was not integrated in the
manufacturer's overall business and the work was performed on multiple landowner's lands);
Gonzalez-Sanchez v. Int'l Paper Co., 346 F.3d 1017, 1021-23 (lth Cir. 2003) (granting summary
judgment against H-2B forestry employee's FLSA claim on same basis).
156. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) ("The term 'employee'. . . shall not include any individual employed as
an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his home .... "). The
NLRA relies on the FLSA's broad interpretation of "agricultural" to exempt all employees of farms
that cultivate the soil, raise livestock and poultry, dairy farms, and related work, including forestry
and some food processing and transportation jobs. 29 U.S.C. § 203(f). See Michael H. LeRoy and
Wallace Hendricks, Should "Agricultural Laborers" Continue to Be Excluded From The National
LaborRelations Act, 48 EMORY L.J. 489, 506 (1999).
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tional Safety and Health Act ("OSHA") 1 57 excludes domestic workers from
its coverage,15 8 and Congress prohibits OSHA from inspecting farms with
ten or fewer employees, a limitation that applies to nearly half of hired
farmworkers.1 5 9 Nine state-run workers compensation systems have restricted or precluded death benefits to nonresident alien beneficiaries, which
acutely impacts guest workers, whose family members are far more likely
than the beneficiaries of other workers to be nonresident aliens.160
International law has been construed by courts to limit the availability of
domestic workplace rights to guest workers. Courts have held that the Vienna
Convention grants absolute immunity to diplomats who violate the workplace rights of domestic workers, 16 1 which is a primary source of employment for A-3 and G-5 workers. In Reyes-Gaona v. North Carolina Growers
Association,16 2 the Fourth Circuit held that there is a presumption against the
international application of anti-discrimination laws. In Reyes-Gaona, a
foreign national filed suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA")16 3 because a U.S. employer explicitly refused.to hire him as an
H-2A worker because he was over forty years old. The Fourth Circuit
invoked a "presumption against extraterritorial application of a federal
statute," based upon a Supreme Court decision holding that a U.S. law is not
extraterritorial in reach unless Congress provides for it.' 6" Since Congress
did not specifically provide for extraterritorial coverage of the ADEA to
foreign nationals, the court in Reyes-Gaona found that the plaintiff failed to
overcome the presumption against extraterritorial application. 165 Some commentators have argued that the court in Reyes-Gaona misapprehended the
presumption against extraterritoriality, since the international law principle at

157.
158.
159.

29 U.S.C. § 651 etseq.
29 C.F.R. § 1975.6.
Jack L. Runyan, SUMMARY OF FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AFFECTING AGRICULTRUAL

EMPLOYERS, AGRICULTURAL HANDBOOK No. 719, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. 7 (2000). Congress has limited

OSHA's jurisdiction over small farms through annual appropriation bills. See, e.g., HR 2264, 105th
Cong. (1998).
160. Workers' compensation laws in many states bar the non-resident family members of workers
killed on the job from receiving full benefits .... Some states limit compensation compared to the
benefits a. lawful resident would have received, generally 50% (Arkansas, Delaware, Florida,
Kentucky, Pennsylvania). Other states limit coverage based on: the length of time a migrant has been
a citizen (Wisconsin), the laws of the alien resident beneficiary's home country (Washington), or the

cost of living in the alien resident beneficiary's home country (Oregon). Alabama denied benefits to
all foreign beneficiaries. Cleveland, Lyon, and Smith, supra note 106, at 819.
161. See Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535, 538-39 (4th Cir. 1996) ("Day-to-day living services such as
dry cleaning or domestic help were not meant to be treated as outside a diplomat's official functions.
Because these services are incidental to daily life, diplomats are to be immune from disputes arising
out of them.").
162. 250F.3d 861 (4th Cir. 2001).
163. 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.
164. Reyes-Gaona, 250 F.3d at 864 (citing EEOC v. ArabianAmerican Oil v. Filardo,9 U.S. 244,
248 (1991)).
165. Id. at 866-67.
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16 6
stake is that "one country cannot impose its labor standards on another,"
and in this instance the application of anti-discrimination laws to guest
workers would only impose liability for work performed inside the U.S.
Nonetheless, a broad reading of Reyes-Gaona would insulate employers
from liability under anti-discrimination laws for instructing guest worker
recruiters to refuse to hire, for example, applicants of a particular age, gender,
color, or race, because the recruitment takes place internationally.
Lastly, exempting undocumented workers from key workplace protections
and from legal remedies for violations challenge equality in the workplace
and further burdens the sovereignty interest in preserving workplace standards. In Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB,"),167 the Court read IRCA to prohibit the NLRB from awarding
post-termination back pay to an undocumented worker who uses false
documentation to establish work authorization without the employer's knowledge. 168 The Court's questionable reading of IRCA 169 and its finding that
permitting back pay in this context would violate "explicit statutory prohibitions critical to federal immigration policy, ' 170 have not been extended much
beyond the availability of post-termination backpay to remedy a violation of
the NLRA. Courts attempting to apply Hoffman Plastic Compounds to laws
intended to preserve workplace standards have generally held that unless
explicitly directed by Congress, the remedial nature of workplace protections
should be uniformly applied in order to preserve workplace standards.1 7 '
However, the tension felt by courts attempting to balance the labor policy of

166. Ruhe C. Wadud, Allowing Employers to Discriminatein the Hiring Process Under the Age
Discriminationin Employment Act: The Case of Reyes-Gaona, 27 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 335,
342 (2001) (discussing cases that reject the Reyes-Gaona analysis).
167. 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
168. Id. at 151-52.
169. The IRCA House Committee Report states that:
It is not the intention of the Committee that the employer sanctions provisions
of this bill be used to undermine or diminish in any way labor protections in
existing law, or to limit the powers of federal or state labor relations boards,
labor standards agencies, or labor arbitrators to remedy unfair practices
committed against undocumented employees for exercising their rights before
such agencies or for engaging in activities protected by existing law. H.R. 682,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1, at 58 (1986).
170. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 151.
171. See Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 6 N.Y.3d 338, 363 (N.Y. 2006) ("We therefore hold, on the
records before us in these ... [New York Labor Law] cases, and in the absence of proof that plaintiffs
tendered false work authorization documents to obtain employment, that IRCA does not bar
maintenance of a claim for lost wages by an undocumented alien."); Affordable Hous. Found.v. Silva,
2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 28303, at **29-**78 (2d Cir. Nov. 14, 2006) (holding that IRCA does not
preempt state laws that provide for compensatory damages to undocumented workers for workplace
injuries); Rivera v. NIBCO, 364 F.3d 1057, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding'that an undocumented
worker is covered by Title VII and distinguishing from Hoffman Plastic Compounds because
Hoffnan involved a review of an administrative decision that did not consider the applicability of
IRCA, and limited the damages the worker could receive under the NLRA, not the employer's
liability); De La Rosa v. N. Harvest Furniture,210 F.R.D. 237, 238-39 (N.D. I11.2002) (reasoning
that a federal district court's remedial power under Title VII differs from the NLRB's power under the
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uniform workplace rights with the immigration policy of restricting noncitizens is apparent in other contexts, such as state laws that disallow workers
compensation benefits to undocumented workers. 17 2 Just as exempting guest
workers from workplace rights undermines equality and sovereignty interests, the Hoffman Plastic Compounds reasoning further threatens U.S.
workers by formally designating undocumented workers as a vulnerable
sub-class in the workplace.
3. Non-Enforcement of Workplace Protections
In addition to the lack of rights of nonprofessional foreign nationals and
U.S. workers in the workplace, most guest workers do not avail themselves
of the workplace rights they have. This is partially a natural consequence of
short term migration to non-professional occupations. Guest workers are in
the U.S. for a short duration, and lack information about their rights and how
to enforce them. The remoteness of common guest worker occupations, such
as in agricultural fields, in forests, and in private homes, and the isolation of
guest workers from the government and from the community at large, make it
unlikely that a guest worker would access an attorney or contact a government agency except in extreme circumstances. 7 3 In addition, workplace
rights are not enforced because of formal limitations to guest worker access
to the judiciary, and because of a lack of administrative enforcement. The
non-enforcement of workplace rights intensifies formal workplace inequalities and violates the sovereignty goals preventing the creation of a vulnerable
sub-class and maintaining the rule of law in nonprofessional workplaces.
Most guest workers who might otherwise be able to sue to enforce contract
terms are unable to because they cannot access legal services. Only H-2A
visa holders are qualified for federally funded ("LSC") legal services.174 All
other nonimmigrant workers must retain a private attorney or a non-LSC
organization in order to secure legal representation. Given guest workers'
lack of information about how to find counsel, language and educational
limitations that prevent them from representing themselves pro se, and their
lack of funds to hire an attorney, preventing guest workers from obtaining

NLRA, and thus that Hoffman was not "dispositive of the issues raised in the motion to compel"
discovery of immigration status in a Title VII action).
172. See Cleveland, Lyon, and Smith, supra note 107, at 868-79 (listing cases and incidents from
newspaper articles in which Hoffman Plastic Compounds was invoked as a justification to deny a
right or benefit).
173. See, e.g., Bernstein, Suit to Charge, supranote 78 (reporting that H-2B worker stated that he
only attempted to find help after the employer confiscated his passport, forced him to work 80 hours a
week at far less than the minimum wage, denied him emergency medical care, and threatened to
contact ICE to request his removal).
174. 45 C.F.R. § 1626.11. This regulation only permits LSC representation to enforce H-2A
wage, housing, and transportation rights, and "other employment rights provided for in the worker's
specific contract under which the nonimmigrant worker was admitted." Id.
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free legal services virtually bars them from litigating claims in the court
system. 175
Because guest workers lack access to an attorney and legitimately fear that
a complaint would jeopardize their ability to work in the U.S., their interest in
workplace equality and U.S. workers' sovereignty interest in maintaining the
rule of law in nonprofessional workplaces depend upon effective monitoring
by government agencies. However, DOL inspects few workplaces prior to
the filing of a complaint. DOL in 2004 conducted only 89 investigations into H-2A employers, 176 the only program that DOL monitors. The lack of
government oversight over the workplace conditions of guest workers is
particularly troubling for guest domestic workers, who often work in an
isolated setting for an employer with heightened control over the worker.
This concern is expressed in the Foreign Affairs Manual requirement that A-3
and G-5 employers provide a contract to employees at the prevailing wage,
while simultaneously conceding that DOS and the "consular officers are not
in a position to enforce
behavior of employers or employees when in the
177
States[.],,
United
To summarize this section, the lack of meaningful workplace protections,
of free legal counsel and of effective government enforcement violate foreign
nationals' interest in equality, and undermines the sovereignty interests in
maintaining workplace standards and the rule of law. They also raise valid
concerns that U.S. workers cannot compete with guest workers and undocumented workers because of the employer preference for workers who cannot
complain about workplace conditions, and because of perverse incentives to
hire them because they lack key workplace protections. Employers have the
perverse incentive to hire H-2A workers over U.S. workers because they are
exempt from AWPA; employers in high risk industries have a perverse
incentive to hire guest and undocumented workers because of limitations to
the death benefits of guest worker beneficiaries; employers have a perverse
incentive to hire undocumented workers because of restrictions on their
workplace rights. Interpretations of international law that exempt guest
worker from anti-discrimination laws create a perverse incentive for employers to hire guest workers in order to insulate themselves from liability for
discriminatory hiring practices. These perverse incentives sacrifice the interest of nonprofessional foreign nationals in equality in the workplace, and the
sovereignty interest in protecting U.S. workers from a vulnerable sub-class.
Nor does the lack of meaningful workplace rights assist in the sovereignty

175. Boone, supra note 31 (recounting a statement made by an H-2B plaintiff in back wages suit:
"I came here expecting to work hard and make money to support my family. What I didn't expect was
to risk my life, be cheated out of my earnings, and then learn that the legal-aid lawyers who U.S.
citizens rely on in such cases couldn't help me").
176. See Lomet Turnbull, New State Import: Thai Farmworkers, THE SEAT-LE TIMES, Feb. 20,
2005, at Al.
177. 9 FAM 41.21 N6.2(c).
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goal of deterring unauthorized migration. On the contrary, limiting workplace rights based on immigration status heightens the employer demand for
undocumented and guest workers as a source of exploitable labor.
C. Immigration Restrictions,Exclusion and Enforcement
Immigration policy attempts to control the flow of nonprofessional foreign
nationals through the exclusionary measures of border control and interior
enforcement, while managing migration through nonprofessional guest worker
programs. However, combining small guest worker programs with heightened immigration enforcement has failed to meet the sovereignty goal of
deterring unauthorized migration, and has severely restricted the liberty
interests of nonprofessional foreign nationals, who lack a reasonable opportunity to engage in authorized migration. First, these measures have not
controlled unauthorized migration, which has increased.' 7 8 In fact, the
increased difficulty of unauthorized border-crossing has disrupted the traditional Mexico-U.S. migrant flow
and forced the settlement of previously
79
temporary workers in the U.S.1
Second, guest worker programs are too small and under-utilized to
reasonably accommodate the migration demand of nonprofessional foreign
nationals, and are ill-suited for this purpose. While over a half million
nonprofessional foreign nationals engage in unauthorized migration per year,
only 89,000 H-2B visas are issued per year, 180 and the H-2A visa is
underutilized because employers easily avoid the H-2A certification process
by hiring undocumented workers. 18 1 All guest work visas are restricted in
duration from one year to 18 months, with a maximum of ten years. 182 Nor
are other nonprofessional work visas designed to control the migration flow:
J-1 visas are contemplated for young, college-educated persons, while the
A-3 and G-5 visas can only be used for employment with consular, diplomatic or international organization personnel, a small pool of employers.
By severely restricting the number of nonprofessional foreign nationals
authorized to enter the U.S., guest worker programs fail to meet the liberty
interest in freedom of movement, which undermines the sovereignty interest

178. Wayne A. Cornelius, Impacts of the 1986 U.S. Immigration Law on Emigration from Rural
Mexican Sending Communities, 15 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 689, 702 (1989); Richard C. Jones,
Immigration Reform and Migrant Flows: Compositionaland Spatial Changes in Mexican Migration
After the Immigration Reform Act of 1986, 85 ANNALS Ass'N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 715, 725 (1995);
David Griffith and Ed Kissam, WORKING POOR: FARMWORKERS INTHE UNITED STATES 260-62 (1995).
179. Durand, Massay, and Parrado, The New Era of Mexican Migration to the United States, 86 J.
AM. HISTORY 518, 522 (1999).

180. Under current law, workers having completed an H-2B work visa may return as "H-2R"
workers and has resulted in a total of 134,000 H-2B and H-2R visas issued in 2006. DHS
NONIMMIGRANT STATISTICS, supra note 1.
181. See Hancock, supra note 92. Only 46,000 H-2A visas were issued in 2006. See DHS
NONIMMIGRANT STATISTICS, supra note 1.
182. 22 C.F.R. § 41.112(b)(2).
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in deterring unauthorized migration. 183 Guest worker visa caps and restrictions thus heavily rely on the immigration enforcement measures of border
control, employer sanctions, and workplace raids to stem the migrant flow,
prevent employers from hiring undocumented workers, and apprehend foreign nationals who engage in unauthorized work.
However, immigration enforcement undermines the sovereignty interest in
the rule of law by facilitating the growth of the underground economy, and
severely impacts nonprofessional foreign nationals' interests in liberty and
equality. Interior enforcement funnels undocumented workers into a lowwage, "underground" economy of unregulated manufacturing and service
industries that disregard immigration and employment laws.18 4 Heightened
militarization of the border has increased the physical risk of unauthorized
migration,1 85 and the incarceration of apprehended migrants.1 86 Once inside,
intensive interior enforcement contributes to the poverty of undocumented
workers by driving them deeper into the underground economy.18 7 When
administrative priorities turn to apprehending undocumented workers through
workplace raids, a "climate of fear"' 8 pervades. Furthermore, interior enforcement directly harms the foreign national interest in equality in the workplace and
the U.S. worker sovereignty interest in maintaining workplace standards, as
183. Kritz, supra note 109, at 957 (concluding that restrictive immigration policies result in
increased unauthorized migration).
184. See VALENZUELA, THEODORE, MELENDEZ ET AL., ON THE CORNER: DAY LABOR IN THE UNITED
STATES 12, 15 (2006) available at http://www.sscnet.ucla.edulissr/csup/index.php (providing the
results of a national survey of day laborers that finds that 75% are undocumented, nearly half report
nonpayment and underpayment of wages, and one in five has suffered a workplace injury); U.S. DEP'T
OF LABOR, FY 2000 POULTRY PROCESSING COMPLIANCE REPORT (2000) (reporting that 100% of

investigated poultry plants violated the federal wage and hour laws); U.S. Dep't of Labor, Close to
Half of Garment ContractorsViolating FLSA, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 87 (1996) (reporting that half
of New York City garment contractors could be described as "sweatshops."); U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
COMPLIANCE HIGHLIGHTS 1, 3 (1999) (reporting that a survey of cucumber, lettuce and onion growers
showed a lack of labor and employment law compliance); Susan Gonzalez Baker, The "Amnesty"
Aftermath: Current Policy Issues Stemming from the Legalization Programsof the 1986 Immigration
and Reform Act, 31 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 5, 20-21 (1997); J. Edward Taylor and Dawn Thilmany,
Worker Turnover, Farm Labor Contractors, and IRCA's Impact on the California Farm Labor
Market, 75 AM. J. AGRIC. EcON. 350, 359 (1993).

185. See Wayne A. Cornelius, Death at the Border: Efficacy and Unintended Consequences of
U.S. Immigration Control Policy, 27 POP'N & DEv. REV., 661,669 (2001) (documenting that reported
deaths of unauthorized border-crossers more than quintupled between 1996 and 2000, from 87 in
1996 to 499 in 2000).
186. James C. McKinley Jr., Tougher Tactics DeterMigrants at U.S. Border, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21,
2007, at A1 (reporting that migrants caught in the border are now immediately prosecuted for illegal
entry, and sentenced to between two weeks and 180 days in jail).
187. Cobb-Clark, Shiells and Lowell, Immigration Reform: The Effects of Employer Sanctions
and Legalization on Wages, 13 J. OF LABOR ECON. 472, 495-96 (1995); Julie A. Phillips and Douglas
Massey, The New Labor Market: Immigrants and Wages after IRCA, 36 DEMOGRAPHY, 233, 244
(1999) (finding a 22% and 55% difference between the incomes of nonagricultural and agricultural
incomes respectively for documented and undocumented immigrants); Massey, New Evidence from
Mexico, supra note 48, at 267 (finding no wage disparity between documented and undocumented
immigrants in data from 1982-83); JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEw HISPANIC CENTER, UNAUTHORIZED
MIGRANTS: NUMBERS AND CHARACTERISTICS 34 (2005), availableat http://pewhispanic.orglfiles/reportsl

46.pdf (finding that unauthorized immigrants are twice as likely to live in poverty).
188. Bernstein, Immigrants Gofrom Farms to Jail,and a Climate of Fear Settles In, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 24, 2005, at A21.
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189
workplace raids often target workplaces that are the subject of a labor dispute,
and employer sanctions provide employers with an excuse to purge undocumented
workers who support organized labor.19
To summarize, guest worker programs are largely controlled by U.S.
employers with little governmental oversight, lack workplace protections to
sufficiently protect guest workers, and are too small and restricted to meet the
migration demand, resulting in a reliance on immigration enforcement as the
primary response to nonprofessional foreign nationals who seek to migrate to
the U.S. Employer centrality and a lack of workplace protections in guest
worker programs violate nonprofessional foreign nationals' liberty and
equality interests through recruitment abuses that create indebtedness, a lack
of enforceable workplace rights, and their dependence on a single employer
for their authorized presence in and ability to return to the U.S. These
conditions also sacrifice U.S. worker sovereignty interests in preserving
workplace standards and the rule of law by creating a vulnerable sub-class of
workers who are preferred by employers because they cannot complain about
violations and lack key workplace protections. Liberty, equality, and sovereignty interests are further harmed by the small size and utilization of guest
worker programs. This results in an exclusive reliance on immigration
enforcement to control the migrant flow, which burdens equality and sovereignty interests by creating a vulnerable sub-class of undocumented workers
who work in an underground economy that routinely violates immigration
and employment laws. Exclusively relying on immigration enforcement to
manage the labor-based migrant flow also severely restricts liberty interests
by preventing any meaningful opportunity to engage in authorized migration,
by forcing migrants who seek to engage in unauthorized work to risk
incarceration and physical well-being during their migration, and by having
migrants live with the pervasive fear of detection by the government once
inside the U.S.

IV.

A NON-SUBORDINATION APPROACH TO WORK-BASED IMMIGRATION

There is an inherent tension in how to balance liberty, sovereignty, and
equality interests in regulating the migration of nonprofessional foreign
nationals. Guest worker programs have attempted to balance liberty and
sovereignty interests by admitting foreign nationals to contract with U.S.
employers for temporary work, while excluding undocumented workers, and
restricting the number of guest work visas, and the nature and conditions of

189. Michael Wishnie, Introduction: The Border Crossed Us: Current Issues in Immigrant
Labor, 28 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 389, 390-92 (2004) (reporting that in a sample of 184
workplaces subject to an immigration raid in the New York area, over half had active labor complaints
close in time to the raid).
190. HAUs, supra note 14, at 75-78; PETER BROWNELL, MIGRATION INFORMATION SOURCE, THE
DECLINING ENFORCEMENT OF EMPLOYER SANCTIONS 6 (2005), availableat http://www.migrationinfor-

mation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id= 332.
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guest work. However, this Article has shown how an immigration policy of
small, restrictive guest worker programs alongside an enforcement-driven
approach to deterring unauthorized migration undermine the liberty, equality,
and sovereignty interests of foreign born and U.S. nonprofessional workers,
and are therefore an unsound foundation for comprehensive immigration
reform. 19 1
At the same time, expanding work-based visas for nonprofessional foreign
nationals to balance the interests of nonprofessional U.S. workers and foreign
nationals is preferable to ending temporary work-based programs entirely or
maintaining the status quo, and may be more realistic and targeted than
controlling the migrant flow by increasing permanent immigration quotas.
First, the alternative to authorized migration is not an absence of immigration, but rather unauthorized migration. There will remain a high rate of
unauthorized migration so long as developing countries lack sufficient
employment opportunity and there are available jobs in the U.S., 192 and the
migrant flow cannot be contained by immigration enforcement alone. 193 The
current unauthorized flow therefore presents a compelling need for expanding labor-based admissions to manage the migration of nonprofessional
foreign nationals.
Further, responding to the failings of the current guest work system by
ending labor-based admissions for nonprofessional foreign nationals would
sacrifice liberty and equality gains that do not threaten, but rather complement, sovereignty goals. Given that authorized migration is generally beneficial for U.S. workers because it adds to the U.S. workforce and expands the
U.S. economy,' 94 labor-based admissions with meaningful measures to
manage the migrant flow and to preserve workplace standards in nonprofessional occupations would be preferable from a sovereignty standpoint than
immigration enforcement alone. As in the end of the Bracero Era, when
undocumented immigration soared after its discontinuance as workers who

191. For example, while AgJobs and McCain-Kennedy each contained important reforms to
existing law, such as permitting the adjustment of status for undocumented workers and expanding
authorized migration, they also suffered from over-reliance on the current programs' scaffolding:
AgJobs, like H-2A, only applied to agricultural workers, would have maintained employer centrality,
and had no portability or means to adjust status, AgJobs §§ 101(c)(1)(A), 218(a), and McCainKennedy would also have maintained the current certification system, and, like H-2B, would have
capped the guest worker program at too few visas to provide a meaningful alternative to unauthorized
migration. McCain-Kennedy § 218A.
192. Philip Martin, ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND MIGRATION: THE MEXICO-U.S. CASE 20-21
(2002) (arguing that unauthorized migration from Mexico is a result of high joblessness rates in
Mexico).
193. Even if border security deterred all unauthorized Mexico-U.S. border crossings, that would
do nothing to prevent migrants from "overstaying" nonimmigrant tourist, business, and student visas
and Border Crossing Cards, which account for nearly one half of unauthorized migration. See PEw
HISPANIC CENTER, FACT SHEET, MODES OF ENTRY FOR THE UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION 1-2

(2006), availableat http://pewhispanic.org/files/factsheets/19.pdf.
194. Conservative estimates are that immigration into the United States has produced a surplus of
$7 billion per year. George J. Borjas, The Economic Benefits from Immigration, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 5
(1995), cited in Chang, Immigration Restrictions,supra note 37, at 305 & n.71.
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established regular migration patterns as braceros found themselves shut out
of authorized status, t9 5 ending guest worker programs entirely will likely
increase unauthorized migration, violating a key sovereignty interest. Thus,
ending labor-based admissions without providing a means for authorized
migration would sacrifice liberty, equality, and sovereignty interests.
Second, the argument that the status quo is preferable to the expansion of guest
worker programs because it would establish a formal subclass of workers does not
acknowledge that U.S. currently maintains an informal labor migration policy of
managing over seven million undocumented workers by relaxing or intensifying
immigration enforcement. This informal policy allows U.S. employers to
employ a sub-class of millions of workers during times of high labor demand,
and permits their exclusion during times of economic anxiety.196 While this
informal policy serves the liberty interest of affording greater migration flow
than a formal expansion of labor-based admissions might, it undermines the
value of this liberty by causing fear by migrants of government institutions' 97
and the public during economic downturns which are attributed to unauthorized migration.19 8 It also violates key sovereignty goals of reducing unauthorized migration and maintaining the rule of law in nonprofessional workplaces, and the equality interest of nonprofessional foreign nationals who are
undocumented workers, who face crushing debts from the expense of
migration,' 99 and often cannot access government-provided health care,
public benefits, legal representation, or higher public education. 200 Given

195.

Philip Martin, Guest Workers: Past and Present, 880, 888 in MIGRATION BETWEEN MEXICO

AND THE UNITED STATES: BINATIONAL STUDY, VOL. 3 (1998) (noting that apprehensions nearly

doubled between 1964 and 1965, and nearly doubled again by 1971).
196. Gordon H. Hanson and Antonio Spilimbergo, Political Economy, Sectoral Shocks, and
BorderEnforcement 34, CAN. J. OF ECON., 612, 636 (2001) (comparing border apprehensions to the
price of goods produced in industries that employ undocumented workers over time "suggests that
authorities relax border enforcement when the demand for undocumented workers is high. We also
find that border enforcement rises when overall conditions in the United States tighten").
197. April McKenzie, A Nation of Immigrants or a Nation of Suspects? State a'nd Local
Enforcement of FederalImmigration Laws Since 9/11, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1149, 1160 (2004); Muzaffar
A. Chisti, Migration Regulation Goes Local: The Role of States in U.S. Immigration Policy, 58
N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 371, 373-74 (2002).
198. Baker, supra note 4, at 22. This is often expressed in local laws that target foreign nationals
for adverse treatment. See, e.g., Guadalupe T. Luna, Immigrants, Cops and Slumlords in the Midwest,
29 S. ILL. U.L.J. 61, 73-77 (2004) (discussing housing restrictions aimed at foreign-born Latinos);
Jahana Berry, Smuggling Verdict Tossed, Judge Cites Lack of Evidence on Migrant, Az. REPUBLIC,
Dec. 6, 2006, at 1 (discussing use by Arizona prosecutors of state anti-smuggling law to prosecute
unauthorized migrants).
199. See Gabriela A. Gallegos, Border Matters: Redefining the National Interest in U.S.-Mexico
Immigration and Trade Policy, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1729, 1754 (2004); Chris Paschenko, Immigrants
Prospering,THE DECATUR DAILY (ALA.), Nov. 16, 2006 (State and Regional News) (citing payment
of $15,000 for transportation from Mexico).
200. See Michael J. Wishnie, Introduction: Immigration and Federalism,58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 283, 283 & n.1 and n.2 (2002); Andrew Stevenson, Dreaming of an Equal Future for
Immigrant Children: Federal and State Initiatives to Improve Undocumented Students'Access to
Postsecondary Education, 46 ARiz. L. REv. 551, 553-54 (2004); Leslye E. Orloff & Janice V.
Kaguyutan, Offering A Helping Hand: Legal Protectionsfor BatteredImmigrant Women: A History of
Legislative Responses, 10 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 95, 127-29 (2001) (discussing how LSC
representation of unauthorized immigrants only permitted in cases of domestic violence).
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these realities, expanding labor-based admissions would be preferable to the
status quo if it adjusted the status of all currently undocumented workers,
controlled the future migrant flow, and did not undermine workplace conditions in nonprofessional occupations.20 1
Lastly, expanding labor-based admissions is a more realistic and tailored
approach to control migration than replacing guest worker programs with
increased permanent residence. Permanent residence is limited to 140,000
people per year,2 °2 and the INA currently provides for adjusting the status of
only 5,000 low-skilled workers per year to permanent legal resident status.20 3
Even if the INA reserved all permanent residence visas for labor purposes,
this would not approach the number of H-2A, H-2B, J- 1,A-3, and G-5 visas,
or the current unauthorized migrant flow of 750,000 per year. Inasmuch as
permanent residence admissions currently privileges family-based admissions, reserving these admissions for labor purposes would sacrifice the
considerable interest of foreign nationals in reuniting with family members.
Thus, permanent residence is not a realistic alternative to replace the
hundreds of thousands of guest worker visas, on top of additional visas
necessary to control the migrant flow, and may sacrifice the interest of
foreign nationals in family reunification.
A temporary labor-based admissions system that allowed for eventual
adjustment of status would satisfy the liberty interests of those nonprofessional foreign nationals who seek entrance to the U.S. to engage in circular
migration. 20 4 For transnational workers who do not wish to permanently
settle in the U.S., a work-based visa that permitted circular migration to the
U.S. to would be preferable to waiting for permanent migration. 0 5 For those
desiring permanent settlement in the U.S., a temporary work-based visa that
permitted adjustment of status would afford foreign nationals with a reasonable alternative to unauthorized migration. Given the liberty and sovereignty
interests in maximizing authorized migration to manage the migrant flow,
and the fact that many transnational workers seek to engage in circular
migration rather than to permanently settle in the U.S., a labor-based
admission program that offered eventual adjustment of status would be a
more practical and targeted means to control the migrant flow than replacing

201. See BASOK, supra note 105, at 96-98 (documenting a survey in which 565 Mexican guest
workers in Canada, 158 of whom had been undocumented workers in the U.S., expressed preference
for guest work over undocumented work because of better conditions, ease of border crossing, lack of
transportation expenses, and secure and enforceable contract).
202.
U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGR. STATS., 2004 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION
STATISTICS 15 TBL.4 (2006), available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/yearbook/2004/
Yearbook2004.pdf.
203.

U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, VISA BULLETIN FOR JULY 2006, cited in MPI, IMMIGRATION AND

AMERICA'S FUTURE, supra note 11, at 23.
204. See, e.g., MASSEY, DURAND, AND MALONE, supra note 39, at 145; Manuel Pastor and Susan
Alva, Guest Workers and the New Transnationalism: Possibilities and Realities in an Age of
Repression, 31 SOC. JUST. 92, 93 (2004).
205.

MASSEY, DURAND, AND MALONE, supra note 39, at 145.
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guest work visas with permanent migration.
Thus, a non-subordination approach to temporary work-based visas that
accommodated core liberty, sovereignty, and equality concerns may be
preferable to ending guest worker programs entirely or preserving the status
quo, and may be more practical and tailored to controlling the migrant flow
than increasing labor-based admissions through permanent migration.
A. A Non-SubordinationApproach
This Article proposes a re-envisioning of work-based visa programs to
balance the interests of foreign nationals outside the U.S. in free movement
to and from the U.S. and in equality in the workplace, and of U.S. workers in
deterring unauthorized migration and in preserving employment opportunities with meaningful workplace standards in nonprofessional occupations.
This Article recommends expanding labor-based admissions and permitting
visa holders the right to circular migration and eventual permanent settlement to satisfy the liberty interest in free movement, applying uniform
workplace rights to establish formal equality between U.S. workers and
foreign nationals, and allowing the least restrictive measures necessary to
preserve workplace standards for U.S. workers. I term this balancing of
interests a "non-subordination" approach.
This approach does not suggest an "optimal" labor-based admission policy
for nonprofessional foreign nationals, whether a strictly work-based visa
awarded by lottery, a "point" system like those in Canada, Australia, and
New Zealand that would evaluate visa applicants based on their individual
characteristics, or a European Union model of establishing a geographic
common market, or some mix of -these.2" Given the U.S. history of guest
worker programs and the likelihood of their continuance, it will apply this
approach primarily to a strictly employment-based system, understanding
that it could be applied to others. In recognition of the failure of guest worker
programs to meet core liberty, equality, and sovereignty interests, I will call
this program a "temporary work-based" visa rather than a "guest" work visa.
This approach would satisfy the liberty interests of foreign nationals
outside the U.S. to engage in circular migration and permanent settlement in
the U.S. at the point beyond which would exceed the U.S. economy's ability
to absorb new entrants into nonprofessional occupations. This approach
would give respect to the sovereignty view of managing migration by
limiting immigration to preserve workplace standards for U.S. workers. At
the same time, this approach would permit far more nonprofessional foreign
nationals to engage in authorized work in the U.S. than guest worker

206. Chang, LiberalizedImmigration, supra note 11, at 1148, 1182; Ayelet Shachar, The Racefor
Talent: Highly Skilled Migrants and Competitive Immigration Regimes, 81 N.Y.U.L. REv. 148,
171-93 (2006). The Immigrant Accountability Act of 2007 would have used a point system in
adjusting the status of unauthorized migrants in the U.S. See S. 1225, 110th Cong. (2007).
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programs currently allow, because the work-based visa program would not
be restricted to a particular industry, or to seasonal or otherwise temporary
employment.
Second, this approach would de-link employers from the visa process, and
permit porting to other worksites. It would reject a sovereignty-based critique
that portability would undermine workplace standards where visa holders
port, because that concern can be addressed by restricting portability to
workplaces that are not subject to a labor dispute, and in other instances is
outweighed by the liberty gain in freedom of movement, the equality interest
in a uniform application of the at-will doctrine, and the sovereignty interest in
avoiding the creation of a vulnerable sub-class that cannot engage in
self-help to leave an exploitative workplace.
Third, a non-subordination approach would establish clear minimum
allowable terms and conditions of employment equally applicable to workers
in the U.S. regardless of immigration status, and provide for improved
government monitoring over nonprofessional workplaces and access to the
judiciary for nonprofessional foreign nationals. A non-subordination approach would reject a globalist critique that permitting foreign nationals to
sell their services at rates below the legal minimum would advance their
liberty interests, because that interest is outweighed by the equality and
sovereignty interests in uniform workplace standards.
Lastly, in light of the liberty interest in freedom of movement without fear
of apprehension and the sovereignty interest in preventing the creation of a
vulnerable sub-class of workers, a non-subordination approach would adjust
the status of current unauthorized migrants in the U.S. and would permit their
adjustment of status from within the U.S., understanding that some level of
immigration enforcement is necessary to control the future migrant flow.
The remainder of this Part shall discuss the three themes of reducing
employer centrality, preserving workplace standards, and controlling the
migrant flow in detail as they might be applied to immigration reform that
involves a work-based visa program for nonprofessional foreign nationals.
B. A Non-SubordinationApproach to Work-Based Visa Programs
1. Reducing Employer Centrality
Labor-based admissions programs for nonprofessional workers condition authorization to work on recnitment by the individual employer who petitioned for the
visa, and prohibit working for any other employer while in the U.S. Employer
centrality in guest worker programs restricts the liberty of guest workers to seek
their preferred work and to engage in self-help, establishes formal inequality in the
workplace by placing a legal disability on guest workers that does not apply to
other nonprofessional workers, and violates the sovereignty goal of preventing the
creation of a vulnerable sub-class.

GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:521

De-linking employers from the labor-based admissions process and removing the restrictions preventing visa holders from leaving their employment
would advance liberty, sovereignty, and equality interests.2 °7 This could be
achieved by regulating how foreign nationals obtain visas, and by replacing
employer-driven labor market tests with government-run surveys of the
ability of labor markets to absorb nonprofessional foreign nationals. Recruitment abuses could be deterred by changing the pre-departure focus from
connecting workers to individual jobs to "qualifying" workers for work in
high-demand occupations in the U.S. Foreign nationals would be qualified
for an occupation through proof of prior work in the occupation, or by a
training program run by private agencies, the sending country, or DOL. If the
sending country were to play a role in qualifying applicants, the U.S. could
enter multi-lateral agreements with sending countries to regulate private
recruiters. 20 8 To diminish the importance of recruiters and to reduce migrant
dependence on predatory lenders in traveling to the U.S., the U.S. could
encourage the creation of international lending programs to provide migrant
workers with access to credit.
To arrive at a number of annual visas that appropriately balances liberty
and sovereignty interests, the U.S. could commission economic studies to
determine the maximum number of new entrants into particular occupations
by region above which workplace standards would be depressed. Preference
could be given to foreign nationals who have previously completed visa
terms on a seniority basis. In a point-based system, CIS could give preferences to visa applicants who come from regions with humanitarian crises, or
who have family members in the U.S. In a regionally defined system, CIS
could distribute those visas on a first-come, first-served, or a lottery basis to
applicants in countries approved for labor-based migration, presumably those
sending countries where the migrant flow originates.
In such a system, there would be no need for employer applications for
visas. Rather, labor-based visas could be issued without restriction, or with
reasonable occupational or regional restrictions to protect U.S. workers from
local labor surpluses. Visas could be reissued by CIS to visa holders based
upon proof of work in the approved occupation or region during the visa
term. If the posting of job availability through clearance orders were
continued, DOL could condition the approval of clearance orders upon a
showing that the employer has the resources to meet the terms of the
employment contract, has no significant workplace violation in the recent
past, that the work terms meet or exceed the minimum standards, and that

207. McCain-Kennedy would have permitted a 45-day grace period for the nonimmigrant to find
other employment. McCain-Kennedy § 218A(d)(3). Instead of granting portability, AgJobs would
have created a just cause contract for the duration of the visa and arbitration procedures to adjudicate
terminations. AgJobs §§ 101(b)(2)(A)-(B).
208. As in the early Bracero Era, which has been credited with eliminating recruiter abuses in
Mexico during that period. See GAL&RZA, supra note 128, at 254-55.
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that the visa holder would not replace an existing employee. Upon approval
of the clearance order, CIS could transmit it to the agency that regulates
recruitment, up to the maximum allowable visas, with the clearance orders
with the most generous terms receiving priority in distribution. Visa holders
could select the positions they are qualified for on a first come, first serve
basis, or based on a lottery system. Before departure, the foreign national
would be provided with a copy of the contract and visa through the consulate.
If the visa holder obtained the position before arrival in the U.S., he or she
would be reimbursed for travel and visa fees by the employer, and could
leave employment with that employer to obtain employment elsewhere.
Balancing the liberty interest of ensuring that portability does not reduce the
demand for visa holders and the equality interest in preventing foreign
national indebtedness upon arrival in the U.S., portability for work obtained
internationally may be suspended for an initial period for the employer to
recoup the cost of transportation and visa fees except for good cause, such as
a workplace violation or a lack of work. If it were necessary to protect U.S.
workers to restrict the employment that visa holders could port to, this
approach would tolerate reasonable occupational and geographic restrictions
that provided meaningful portability options. Further, to prevent the recruitment of foreign nationals to replace U.S. workers engaging in concerted
activities, porting to firms that are the subject of an ongoing labor dispute
could be prohibited.
Lastly, all nonprofessional foreign labor programs would be subject to
these same basic requirements. This would prevent employers from "shopping" for visa programs with less stringent requirements, such as misclassifying agricultural workers as H-2B to avoid the H-2A requirements,
or nonagricultural workers as J- 1 instead of H-2B to avoid the statutory caps.
These recommendations would serve the liberty interest in increasing
authorized migration and freedom of movement in the U.S. and the sovereignty interest in maintaining workplace standards. Eliminating the certification process and reducing employer control over selection of foreign nationals as guest workers would deter some of the more egregious recruitment
practices, such as unreasonable fees, predatory loans, visa confiscation, fraud
and intentional hiring discrimination. Clearance orders would no longer
institute a wage 'ceiling,' because guest workers would gravitate towards
jobs with higher wage rates. Portability would permit guest workers to find
other work during periods of work shortage, common in sectors such as
agriculture, 2° 9 qualify them for unemployment insurance benefits during

209. The unemployment rate in the agricultural sector is double the national average. See GAO,
STATUS OF CHANGES, supra note 106, at 3-5.
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temporary job loss, 2 10 permit self-help to quit abusive employers, and
retaliation would no longer pose such a formidable weapon in deterring
job-related complaints, because the worker could more easily secure her
livelihood from another job.
2. Preserving Workplace Standards
To preserve workplace standards, a non-subordination approach would
establish formal equality in the workplace for U.S. workers, guest workers,
and undocumented workers, regulate common forms of foreign national
abuse, and provide for full access to the courts and for strengthened DOL
monitoring of nonprofessional workplaces. A non-subordination approach
would amend AWPA to include H-2A workers, 211 direct DOL to enforce the
Arriaga ruling,21 2 require that workers compensation insurance provide
equal benefits to foreign nationals and their beneficiaries, and remove LSC
immigration-based restrictions on access to free legal services.2 13 Congress
would overrule Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Reyes-Gaona, and other decisional law that precludes employer liability for violations of employment law
based on immigration or transnational status. Workplace equality also requires the removal of financial incentives to hire foreign nationals, such as
current tax exemptions for H-2A and J-1 employees. Amending the tax code
to include temporary work-based visa holders would also serve the equality
goal of qualifying these workers for tax-based government insurance programs. Having established uniform workplace rights, visa-based rights
would be eliminated in a system in which visa holders could compete for any
position, or granted in restricted settings only to the degree that they are
enforceable and do not burden liberty interests. For example, the H-2A
guarantee of three-fourths of the contract could be replaced with a just cause
their duration of non-portability to equalize the
contract for guest workers21for
4
employment relationship.
Non-subordination also implies protections to remove disabilities intrinsic
to a worker's transnationality. Common illegal forms of exploitation of guest
210. Nonimmigrant workers who cannot change jobs through their visas are not "available to
work," which is a universal requirement of state unemployment insurance laws. 26 U.S.C.
§ 3304(a)(14).
211. Under McCain-Kennedy, AWPA would have covered H-5A workers. See McCain-Kennedy
§ 303(1).
212. Enforcement of the Arriagaruling might raise the objection that requiring reimbursement
for travel costs would restrict liberty by making foreign nationals from distant sending countries less
attractive to employers. However, the inequality of exempting foreign nationals from this rule and
subjecting them to extreme indebtedness at the beginning of the contract and the sovereignty interest
in avoiding the creation of a vulnerable sub-class of nonprofessional workers justifies the application
of the FLSA deduction rule to guest workers.
213. AgJobs would have carved "temporary" workers from the LSC restriction by defining these
workers as aliens "lawfully admitted for permanent residence" for all laws (including the LSC
exemption) except the INA. See AgJobs § 101 (b)(1).
214. AgJobs would have created a just cause contract for the duration of the visa and arbitration
procedures to adjudicate terminations. AgJobs §§ 101(b)(2)(A)-(B).
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workers, including requiring the posting of collateral as a condition of hiring,
confiscating guest workers' visas and passports, threatening employees with
deportation, and blacklisting through employer associations would be prohibited by declaring them 'adverse employment actions' for the purposes of
anti-retaliation and anti-discrimination laws, racketeering acts under antiracketeering
laws, and as indication of labor trafficking under anti-trafficking
21 5
laws.
To promote the enforceability of contract terms contained in clearance
orders, a non-subordination approach would support an explicit federal right
of action to enforce clearance order terms, and to recover funds for violations
from recruiters.2 16 It would also support regulations that would not add to the
hiring cost of temporary work-based visa holders, such as joint employer
liability of recruiters and employers, and a requirement that foreign recruiters
register and post a bond. 7
A non-subordination approach would further provide for administrative
changes to enforce existing law, such as extensive DOL monitoring of
workplaces in industries with a high density of transnational workers and in
which pervasive employment law violations have been found, 2 8 enforcement jurisdiction over clearance orders and other visa-based protections, and
federal and state government coordination to monitor the rights of temporary
work-based visa holders. 1 9
3. Controlling UnauthorizedMigration
Given the high demand by nonprofessional foreign nationals to immigrate
to the U.S., it is unlikely that the U.S. can admit all foreign nationals who
would wish to participate in a temporary work-based program. As a result,
unauthorized migration is a present and future reality for the U.S., whether
or not immigration reform includes an expanded labor-based admissions
system.
Reducing the number of undocumented workers is a critical sovereignty
interest, both to manage migration and to preserve workplace standards by

215.

Confiscating immigration documents may constitute a violation of the racketeering offense

18 U.S.C. § 1951, the taking of property through robbery or extortion where the taking affects
commerce, and is explicitly prohibited under some state anti-trafficking laws. See, e.g., N.Y. Penal
Law § 135.35(3) (declaring the labor trafficking of persons by "withholding, destroying, or
confiscating" immigration documents to be unlawful).
216. See AgJobs § 218C(b) (providing federal private right of action to enforce all temporary
worker rights).
217. See McCain-Kennedy § 304(i)(7)(B), (F) (requiring registration of foreign labor recruiters
and permitting DOL to require foreign labor recruiters to post a bond).
218. See Alexandra Villarreal O'Rourke, Embracing Reality: The Guest Worker Program
Revisited, 9 HARv. LATINO L. REv. 179, 194 (2006).
219. See, e.g., N. Carolina Growers'Ass'n, Inc. v. Employment Sec. Comm'n of N. Carolina, No.
I-M-04, Employment Security of North Carolina, Consent Agreement (Sept. 11, 2006) (on file with

author) (North Carolina SWA reached agreement with growers' association prohibiting employers
from charging H-2A workers for recruitment, visa and border crossing fees, or transportation costs).

GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:521

regulating the underground economy. To regulate currently unauthorized
residents and to deter future unauthorized migration, the U.S. can adjust the
status of current undocumented workers and offer work-based visa holders a
right to return and an eventual means to adjust status, or it can rely solely on
enforcement to exclude foreign nationals and to deport unauthorized migrants and work-based visa holders who overstay their visa.
From a non-subordination perspective, adjusting the status of undocumented workers and permitting temporary work-based visa holders the
ability to return and adjust status are essential tools to regulate unauthorized
migration. 220 The history of guest worker programs in the U.S. and abroad
shows that no work-based admissions system can control the future flow
unless it permits circular migration and eventual permanent settlement of
undocumented and temporary work-based visa holders.2 2' Permitting temporary work-based visa holders to engage in circular migration would
advance the liberty interest in freedom of movement to and from the U.S.,
and the sovereignty interests in deterring unauthorized migration by removing the incentive to overstay the visa, and in avoiding the creation of a
vulnerable sub-class unable to complain about workplace violations or to
leave employment with abusive employers.22 2 Providing for sufficient numbers of visas to adjust the status of currently undocumented workers and to
present a reasonable alternative to unauthorized migration would serve the
sovereignty interest in reducing the number of unauthorized migrants in the
U.S., and the liberty interest in decreasing immigration enforcement. Unspent immigration enforcement funds could then be diverted to other sovereignty goals, such as DOL monitoring and job training for nonprofessional
U.S. workers seeking skills that complement rather than compete with
migrant workers.2 23
Allowing undocumented workers and temporary work-based visa holders

220. This is especially true as more effective methods of employment authorization may force
unregulated work further underground, and make this work more irregular, low-paying, and
dangerous. See MPI, IMMIGRATION AND AMERICA'S FUTURE, supra note 11, at 52-53 (calling for a

"secure, biometric, machine-readable Social Security card that allows citizens to easily establish both
their identity and eligibility to work").
221. CALAVITA, supra note 105, at 38-39, 108-112 (discussing how the Bracero program
controlled unauthorized migration by converting undocumented workers inside the U.S. into
braceros); Nicole Jacoby, America's De Facto Guest Workers: Lessons From Germany's Gastarbeiter
for U.S. Immigration Reform, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1569, 1657 (2004) (providing historical
background on U.S. and Germany guest worker programs to show that "immigrants are more likely to
return to their countries of origin if they believe they will not be cut off from future economic
opportunities in their host countries"). McCain-Kennedy and AgJobs aimed to manage unauthorized
migration through adjustment of status. See McCain-Kennedy § 218A (providing for adjustment of
status from unauthorized to temporary); AgJobs §§ 101(a), (c) (providing for initial adjustment of
status from unauthorized to temporary, and from temporary to permanent).
222. The right to return would also advance the equality interest of conferring to visa holders
rights under the Family and Emergency Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., to
accrue "at least 12 months" of service, 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A)(i), for those visa holders who
seasonally work for the same employer.
223. MASSEY, DURAND, AND MALONE, supra note 39, at 162.
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to adjust status and permanently settle would also advance the equality
interest of providing foreign nationals in the U.S. with an equal ability to
perform in the polity. Undocumented and guest workers are currently
disenfranchised groups that have no political voice.22 4 Given that undocumented and guest workers are often accused of harming U.S. workers, one
can well imagine why a governmental agency might resist aggressively
policing workplaces where undocumented and guest workers labor, and why
labor associations might decline to invest scarce resources on guest workers. 225 Even if foreign nationals in an expanded labor-based admissions
program would not themselves be permanent residents, their ability to remain
in the U.S. and their potential to join the polity would improve their ability to
petition employers, policymakers, the courts, and government agencies.
Therefore, offering currently unauthorized immigrants and sufficient foreign
nationals to control the future flow a temporary work-based visa, and
providing all of these visa holders with a right to return and eventual
citizenship, would serve the sovereignty interest of controlling unauthorized
migration, the liberty interest in permitting the freedom of movement, and
the equality interest in the right to petition.
Adjustment of status might be accomplished by allowing undocumented
workers to adjust status while in the U.S. in return for payment of a fine, a
practice that existed in the U.S. until 2001.226 After adjusting all currently
residing unauthorized migrants, either through a work-based visa or some
other status, the number of annual work-based visas would have to be
sufficiently large to present a reasonable alternative to unauthorized migration. The right to renew the visa may be made contingent on proof of
employment history during the previous visa term. Adjustment of status may
be denied for undesirable activities, such as violating the terms of an
immigration restriction, or criminal conduct. 22 7 After a set period, temporary
work-based visa holders would be automatically eligible for permanent
immigration.
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U.S. EMPLOYER CRITIQUE OF THE NON-SUBORDINATION APPROACH

Employers may argue that a more regulated guest worker system would be
worse than the existing system because there would be less demand for
authorized migrants, and it would result in the increased use of undocumented workers. A U.S. employer might argue that de-linking employers
from the recruitment and certification process and providing for job portability will lower employer demand and increase reliance on undocumented
workers.
Not all reforms proposed in this Article will reduce employer demand for
authorized foreign nationals, and some would increase demand. By eliminating visa-based rights, employers would be free to offer temporary workbased visa holders any work condition consistent with federal, state, and
local laws. Replacing a certification system with a self-selecting placement
system would increase the value of the program for employers by removing
complicated application requirements and eliminating delays. Certainly,
portability would reduce the value of work-based visa holders to employers,
because a lack of portability ensures a loyal and dedicated workforce.
However, this Article argues that lack of portability, in conjunction with
arrival debts and unenforceable workplace rights, results in workplace
conditions that often approach involuntary servitude. Whatever its value to
employers, the formalization and expansion of a captive workforce is
outweighed by the U.S.'s commitment to egalitarianism, and the liberty,
equality, and sovereignty interests of nonprofessional foreign nationals and
U.S. workers.
Regarding employer reliance on undocumented workers, the nonsubordination approach presumes the adjustment of status of all currently
undocumented workers, and a sufficiently large work-based visa program to
ensure that the future undocumented population remains small. With a large
pool of unauthorized workers to draw upon, no admission program can
manage the migrant flow. Without this pool, employers would be more likely
to obey immigration and labor law.
VI.

CONCLUSION: THE INSOLUBILITY OF UNAUTHORIZED MIGRATION
THROUGH COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM

This Article has argued that a temporary work-based visa that eliminates
employer certification and recruitment, grants nonprofessional foreign nationals formal equality in the workplace, and allows foreign nationals to engage
in circular migration and permanent settlement would advance the interests
of nonprofessional foreign nationals able to obtain visas, and the U.S.
workers who compete with them. Yet, this allocation of rights would
subordinate foreign nationals outside the U.S. who are unable to obtain a
work-based visa, because it would exclude them from the U.S. unless they
engaged in unauthorized migration. To the foreign national forced to engage
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in unauthorized migration to arrive in the U.S., a more formalized immigration enforcement system may be inferior to the current U.S. immigration
policy of turning a blind eye to undocumented workers in industries reliant
on immigrant labor during periods of high labor demand. Thus, from the
vantage point of excluded foreign nationals and future undocumented workers, any approach that would restrict the number of work-based visas is less
desirable than the status quo.
Ultimately, a system that does not allow all foreign nationals seeking
entrance to the U.S. an opportunity to engage in authorized migration cannot
reconcile the liberty, sovereignty, and equality interests of foreign nationals
and U.S. workers. This is the paradox of egalitarianism: any egalitarian
system must define its community, which, in the context of an immigration
policy that enforces national borders, necessarily implies exclusion. The
impossibility of accommodating the global demand to immigrate to the U.S.
is a symptom of global inequality, and a result of the U.S. role as a wealthy
nation with a dynamic economy and a large presence in world relations. This
conclusion suggests that controlling unauthorized migration would require
U.S. trade policies that would expand access to credit and promote job
creation for nonprofessional workers in sending countries. 2 8 By evaluating
the impact of U.S. trade policies on nonprofessional foreign nationals, and
adopting measures that tend to reduce the demand to migrate, the U.S. may
simultaneously address global inequality and advance the sovereignty interest in managing the future migrant flow.
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GCIM REPORT, supra note 2, at 20-22 (arguing that reducing domestic agricultural subsidies would
lessen unauthorized migration); Pia M. Orrenius and Madeline Zavodny, Do Amnesty Programs
Reduce Undocumented Immigration? Evidence from IRCA, 40 DEMOGRAPHY 437, 446 (2003)
(concluding that data from 1969 to 1996 show that a 10% increase of manufacturing wages in Mexico
resulted in a lowering of border apprehensions by 3.3%); Jones, supra note 178, at US 725 (asserting
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from Mexico during the 1980's).

